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INTENT OF THE STUDY ON RECALL AND 
A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
In California municipal politics recall has p l ayed a 
conspicuous role . It has cons i stent l y served as a source of con-
troversy whenever it is undertaken . \.Jhile it is a pr inciple 
inspired by the direct democracy campaign of the California progr ess-
ives in the early twentieth century, it remains as an evolving legal 
process and dynamic political i ssue within the context of 
California political history. 
I . INTENT OF THE STUDY 
In recent literature on American community and national 
politics the recurr ing observa t ion is ma de· that members of the 
e l ectorate feel they are losing control of their politica l 
destiny. Such forces that mitigate against accountability and 
responsiveness by e l ected officials to their constitue ncy are 
indeed important and ought to be more fully understood . At the 
same time there needs to be ·a conscious effort t o r evital ize 
~ 
structures avai l able to the e l ectorate which give them control 
and direction of their polit i cal s ituation. 
The author believes that reca ll, as '-Je ll as other tools of 
direc t democracy, is an area that holds great promise for 
scholarly, as '"e ll as action- oriented research, The recal l process 
ought to be a more politica lly potent recourse to entrenched 
2 
officials \-Jho fa il to perceive the proper nature of their account -
ability. 
There i s a need to more fully explore those areas \-Jhich can 
give back to people some fe e ling of maste ry over their lives. This 
study is based on the premise that recall is an area \.Jhich-- if 
more fully understood from a developmenta l perspective-- might 
continue to serve as a useful t ool in the democratic proce s s . 
The author hopes tha t the paper \-Jill render a context in \-Jhich 
Ca lifornia recall \-Jill be better understood and in which future 
changes will be amenable not only to technica l r equirements, but 
to relevant social and politica l needs as well. 
II. REVIE\-1 OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature on recall in-Ca lifornia is not extensive. 
In 1930 Frederick Bird and Francis Ryan completed the only thorough 
study of recall in California. A few cursory studies h ave been 
compiled s ince 1930 with a lmos t no a ttempt to chronicle the l egal 
and his t orical deve lopme nt of recall. 
Literature ~ the inceptio~ and ~rly development of ~call . 
Bird and Ryan h ave produc·ed_ the mos t comprehensive s tudy of r eca ll 
dea ling wi th the development of the reca ll concep t and its application 
fo llm-1ing adoption in 1911. 1 Th i s s tudy is the basic work fr om which 
a r esearch project must begin. Unfortuna t e l y , no similar work has 
lFrederick L.Bird and Francis M. Ryan. 111e Reca ll of Public 
Officer~: !:_ ~t:udy ~E t he_ ~ation of the ~eca ll in C[tTiforu{;-(Nc\-7 
York : The MacMillan Company, 1930). 
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been comple t ed dealing with the period through t he thir ties to the 
present. 
Valuable background information on the politics surrounding 
the early r eca ll concept can be found in George Mo\-Jry 1 s excellent 
study, The California Progr essives. 2 Mowry i s particular ly useful 
in h is trea tment of a pre -1911 discussion of r ecall as a progress-
ive policy . 
Franklin Hichborn3 is an invaluable s ource for interpreting 
legislative intent and tracing the legislat ive development of r ecall. 
Hichborn has focused upon the actual deba t es and portrays the moo'd 
of the legislative proceed ings, thus providing important insight 
into the initia l stages of recal l development in the s tate . 
The California Cons titution Revis ion Commi ssion i n 1968 
published an exce llent analysis of the State Constitutiona l 
amendment dealing \-Jith r ecall . 4 This stud y provides many useful 
insight s i nto the r at iona le of certain provis ions in the procedure . 
It also gives a most adequate treatment of the general scope · of 
recall as a s t a t e constitutional princip l e . 
Recent studies focusin&_ on munic ipal r eca ll in California . 
Saul Weingarten, former City Attorney of Seas ide,in papers prepared 
2George Mowry . The California Progressives (Berkel ey : 
University of California Press, 1951) . 
3Franklin Hichborn . .Hichborn 1 s Legi s l a tive Bulle tin : Story 
of the Californ ia Legisl ature 1911, 1915 (San Franc isco : J ames H. 
Barry Compony, 19ll, 1915). 
L1California Constitution Revision Commission, Ar ticle XXIII.. : 
Recall Ba ckground Study, Cons t i tut ion Revision Cotnmis sion, San 
Francisco, Ca li fornia , 1968. 
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for the city attorneys of the League of California Cities, reviewed 
the technica lities of r ecal l and important recent cascs,S Graham 
Ritchie, City Attorney of the City of Industry, included a section 
on recall i n hi s paper entitled ''Recent Developments in Initiative, 
Referendum and Recall Law,'' delivered to the same organization in 
1967,6 
F. Armand Magid of Stanford performed an invaluab le task in 
surveying a ll school district recall elections between 1945 and 
1965.7 His study provided valuable insights concerning the size 
of districts in which recall e l ections occur and indicated the 
types of districts in which they occur. Although this study does 
not deal with school district recall la,v, Magid provided useful 
historical data and help ful comnentary, He also provide d locations 
for r esearch for another Stanford doctoral candidate, James A. 
Ke lly, 'vho studied a sample of recall districts to determine '"hether 
Ssaul Weingarten, "Recall Elections in Genera l Law Cities," 
Paper read to the City Attorney's Department, League of California 
Cities, October 30, 1956. 
6Graham A. Ritchie, "Recent Developments in Initiative, 
Referendum, and Recall Lmv," Study on file in the City Attorney's 
Department, League of California Cities, San Francisco, 1967; See 
a l so Hartley H. Bush, "Initr8'tive , Referendum, and Recall --1970," 
Study on file at the League of California Cities, Oakland, 1970 , 
7Fay Armand Magid, "The Reca ll Election of School Board 
Members in California 1946-1965." Dissertation presented to the 
School of Education, Stanford University, 1967. 
5 
recall elections serve as tools of conflict resolution . B Both of 
these studies are sophisticated, quantitative reviews of the recall 
phenomenon. 
III. SIGNIFICANCE AND IDEOLOGICAL 
ORIENTATION OF THE STUDY 
Recall as a subject for debate and research has no~ been 
neg lected. There has been, since its inception, scholarly attention 
given to various aspects of the proced ure. Most treatments of re-
call have, ho1o7ever, been rather sketchy and piecemeal-- not giving 
adequate attention to the concurrent historical and lega l develop-
me:nta of the concept .• 9 
This study attempts to present the legal development of 
recall \.Jithin its hist'orica l and poli!:ical framev10rk and to in-
quire into its uniquely ''democratic" character that r emains as a 
vestige of early twentieth century progressive reforms . 
The author believes that observations on the development of 
r ecall will render important information on the state of direct 
democracy procedures in one of the nation's largest and mos t 
politically conspicuous states . This information will provide 
8Jnmes A. Kelly, Jr. "Conflict Resolution and California 
School Board Elections." Dissertation presented to the. School of 
Education, Stanford University, 1966 . 
9rhe Bird and Ryan study is the outstanding exception to 
this statement. 
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politica l observers with deve lopme ntal patterns that will contri -
bute to specula tions r egar ding the future and potentia l of popularly 
controlled po litica l devices within the conventional politica l 
system. 
Hhilc this project was in the early stages of its prepara-
tion the author developed a bias in favor of strong popular che cks 
against e l ected public officials . This ideol ogical or ientation 
stems partially f rom the belief tha t political pmver elites have 
for too l ong- - and h ave far too easily- - usurped power f rom the 
people, thus l eading to politica l hierarchies that sus t ain them-
selves in office through means other than r espons i veness to needs 
of the e l ectm:ate . Thus, the simpli s tic populist-oriented 
solutions based upon people -control- - "pmver to the people"-- of 
the Progressives appeals to the writer's concept of proper 
conflict resolution as understood within the contemporary demo-
cratic framework. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND OF RECALL 
The concep tion of recall as a procedure for dismissing offici als 
irom public office has its origin in the Wes t ern democratic t radition. 
Careful s tudy of political his tory refutes the notion that r ecall is a 
radical and irrespons ible experiment in democracy . Ins tead, it is 
based upon a concept which underlies the Bill of Rights and is built 
upon an accepted American political tradition, the right of petition . l 
While the bas i c concept of r e ca ll has been deve loped in various poli-
tica l institutions throughout history, the concept of removal f r om 
office earlier than the end of the t erm by popular vote is n ovel. 
Histor i cal Antecedents . The Massachusetts consti t u tion of 1780 
was the first American document to contain the recall principle. In 
Article VIII the cons titution stat ed: 
In order to prevent those who are vested with authority 
from becoming oppressors , the people have the right, at such 
periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their form 
of government, to cause their public officers to return to 
private life , and to fi ll u~ vacant places by certain and regular 
elections and appointments . 
1This observation was f irst made by H. S. Gilbertson, "The Recall--
Its Provis i ons and Signi ficance ," The Annal s of the American Academy 
of Political and Social_ Science , 43 :218, September, 1912 . 
2Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 , Article VIII, Subdivision 1. 
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The firs t official provision for recall in America \-.Jas included 
in the Articl es of Confederation.3 Each state could recall its de l e -
gates from Con gr ess a t any time and send others in their places. 
Recall \.Jas proposed to the Federal Convention by Edmund Randolph on 
May 29, 1787 . Randolph and others at the convention maintai ned a dis-
trust of unc hecked power \oli thin the gover nment branches. Included in 
the Randolph Plan, or Virginia Plan, \vas the provision ,.,her eby the 
first branch of the Na tional Legislature "ough t to be subject to 
recall. "4 On June 12, 1787 , it \olas moved and seconded to strike out 
the measure . 
The actual use of recall dates back t o the fifth century B. C. 
during the Age of Pericles . It was among the great reforms that were 
introduce d :Lnto the Athenian government . Recall was a check against 
the pmo1erful Board of Ten Generals \vho had risen to an exalted position 
of l eadership Hithin the political hierarchy. It could be used agains t 
the Generals at the conclusion of their annual terms in office or they 
could be i ndicted and recalled for malf easance at any time . S 
3For the more convenient management of the general inte rest of the 
United States , delega t es shall be annually appointed in such manner 
as the Legislature of each s t a te shall direct, t o mee t in Congr ess on 
the first Monday in November, in every year, wi th a power r es erved to 
each state to recall its de l egates , or any of them, at any time \vi thin 
the year, and to send other s in t heir stead, for the remainder of the 
year. Article V, Ar t icl es of Confederation. 
4Max Farrand , The Records of the Feder a l Convention of 1787 (Vol. I, 
New Haven: Yale University Press , 1937), p. 20 . 
SEdward McNall Burns, Wes tern Civilizations :Their His t ory and Their 
Culture (sixth edi tion: Ne\ol York: w. vl. Norton and Company , I~,---
1963), p. 156 . 
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Among famous Athenian s recalle d wer e Pericles f rom the office 
6 of Gener.al in l~30 B.C., and other prominent luminaries such as 
Thucydides and Alcibiades , 7 It seems fitting that reca ll originates 
from a source so rich in the democratic tradition and to which modern 
government owes so much . 
George Ke nnan indicates that r eca ll operated in Novgorod the 
Great -- the fir s t Russian Re public- ·· e ight hundred years ago and 
under the lm.;r even the Prince t.;ras not immune from reca l l. 8 
Perhaps closest to the American version of recall was the St.;riss 
Abberuf ung- - a form of r ecall t.;rhich exist ed in several cantonal 
institutions . Though seldom use d it wa s initia t ed any time the proper 
number of pet itioners requested it and a ma jority at the following 
election favored it . 9 
In the Second Treat~~ of Government, John Locke, the English 
political theorist, defends the right of the peopl e to replace those 
in t.;rhom "trus t must ... be forfeited . rrlO Also in line with the 
Eng lish tradition is the concept underlying the practice of Briti sh 
6Evelyn. Abbott, Peric le s and the Golden Age of Athens (New York : 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1891), p. 279.--
7Ge orge F. Kennan, "The Direc t Rule of the People, " North 
American Reviet.;r, 198 : 149 , August 13, 1913. 
8 Kennan, p. 149 . 
9Robert C. Brook . Government and Politics of Switzerland (New 
York: World Book Company, 1918), pp:-321-322 ; See a lso William W. 
Rappard. "The Initiative, Refere ndum, and Recall in Switzerland, " The 
Anna ls of the American Academy ~Politica l and Social Science , Lf3 : 127, 
September, 1912 ; and a lso Margaret A. Schaffer, "Re call ," Yale Revie~, 
18 : 206-209, August, 1909 . 
10John Locke . Second Treatise on Government (Chap t er 13 , paragr aph 
1Lf9) , 
10 
Parliamentary e l ections . While the specified "term" i s five years , 
an election may be called to express public confidence in the perfor-
mance of elected members of Parliament. 
Similarly, in the early Boston city charter existed a provis ion 
.illustrating the purpose of reca ll. Every second year at the general 
election voters were given an opportunity to express themselves 
regarding the mayor's performance in office. If a majority felt his 
four year term should be terminated they would vote to hold a special 
municipa l election tha t year. If the majority favored a special 
election , the mayor was required to stand for re- election--automatically 
cutting his term from four to two years-- or retire.ll 
Recall exemplifies the same pure democratic spirit characterized 
by the early New England town meetings. This concept of retaining 
power in the hands of the people characterized the Populist and 
Progressive reform movements in the late nineteenth and early t'ventieth 
centuries . 
The Progressive Movement . Recall \vas ushered into California by 
the influence of national reform parties intent on changing the condi-
tion and structure of government. Bird and Ryan point out that recall 
was advocated in the national platforms of the Socialis t Labor party in · 
1892 and 1896 and in several of the Populist party state platf orms . 12 
llBenjamin Devlitt, The Progr essive Hovement (Seattle : University of 
Washing ton Press , 1968), p. 234 . 
12Frede rick L. Bir d and Franc i s M. Ryan, The Recall of Public 
Officer1i.: !:__Study of _the Operation 9_~ the Recal!_ in c;i ifo-;nia ( Ne'v 
York: The NacM:Lllan Company, 1930), p. 22. 
In 1910 there were fourteen major points on which the two major 
parties in California agreed and "made equally radical demands. " 
Among the fourteen platform provisions \Y'as recall . 13 
11 
Progressivism could be found in both the Republican and Democratic 
parties throughout the country.l4 A conviction shared by virtually all 
Progressives was that the industrial revolution had given rise to var-
ious social and economic evils that needed immediate national attention . 
California represented a microcosm of the national ills ~Y'hich 
Progressives were attempting to change. Hith the entrenched corrup-
tion and control of California politics by the Southern Pacific railroad, 
the state \vas a central target for "radical" reforms. Hhile big 
business, such as the Southern Pacific, '"as the ultimate enemy of 
Progressives , their proximate enemy was the political machine. 15 
Most of the Progressives hoped to restore popular government as 
they imagined it to have ex is ted in an earlier and purer age. It \vas 
believed that this could be done only by revitalizing the mora le of 
the citizens and utilizing the newly aroused populist zeal to push 
through changes in the mechanics of political life--direc t primaries , 
popular elections of Senators, initiative, r e ferendum, recal l, the 
short bal lot, commission government and others . 
l3John H. Caughey , California (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1940), 
p . 512 . 
14For a discussion of the bi-partisan aspects of Progressivism in 
certain areas of California politics , see Franklin Hichborn' s political 
editorial, Sacramento Bee , October 9, 1910. 
15The corruption and domination of California politics by the 
Southe rn Pacific is b es t portrayed in Samuel G. Blythe , "Putti ng the 
Rollers under the S. P . , " Saturdax_ Evening_ Post, 187:11-12, J anuary 7, 
191.1. 
12 
Paramount 1n Progressive philosophy Has be lief in the people and 
their ability to use reason and good political judgment. Hiram 
Johnson r e flected this belief in his inaugural speech on January 4, 
1911, \oJhen he said the "deep-rooted belief in popular government" 
.res t ed in the peoples' "ability to govern. ul6 
Also fundamental · to progress ivism Has belief in the right of the 
people to determine their des tiny . Echoing this sentiment, ex-Senator 
Albert J. Beveridge \Hote in Collier's Heekly: "The Progressive party 
stands for Thomas Jefferson's principle of the rule of the people; and, 
therefore, for the policy of the right of the people to pass on their 
mm la\-7S and public servants at any time they please. . ul7 
In addition to the positive right of people to govern themselves 
was . the practical matter of establishing a democratic system of checks 
and balances . Theodore Roosevelt, California ' s Hiram Johnson, and 
other Progressive l eaders wanted to create a permanent check on public 
officials who ,.,ere at the time considered to be in the clutches of 
big business . The movement sought to divorce the corporation from 
politics. In Berkeley, Governor Johnson stated that the purpose of the 
initiative , referendum, and recall ,.,as to protect the people "against 
corporation greed, corporation control or political domination."l8 
Recall and thE2. JudiciaJZY.· Possibly more than any other factor, 
disaffection \-lith the judicial branch vms the catalys t to recall. 
Nationally, the Progressives were dismayed \-lith the way in ,.;rhich the 
16Excerpted from the t ext of Johnson' s address , .§_acramento Bee , 
January L,, 1911. 
17Albert J. Beveridge, "Hhat the Progressive Party Stands For," 
Colliers Weekly, 52 : 7-8 , J anuary 31, 1914. 
18Los Angel es Express , October 6, 1911 . 
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courts interpreted social legislation. Decisions in such famous cases 
as Lochner v. Nmv ,Xork, 19 invalidating the New York ten-hour bakeshop 
l a\.;r, and Adair v. United States, 20 declaring void the federal yellmv-
dog contract statute, strictly upheld the classic concept of laissez 
faire. Progressives throughout the country denounced the courts as 
''tools of the trusts, stooges of entrenched corporate interests, enemies 
of the \>10rking man and of the common social welfare. rr2l 
Similarly, in California it \'las widespread distrust and dissaf-
fection with the courts, more specifically the state supreme court, 
which prompted strong support for the adoption of recall . It was felt 
the time had come to make the judicial branch more responsible . 
According to the B~llot Arguments Ei 1911 the specific purpose of r ecall 
\'las to provide a check on the pmvers of the courts and thereby give the 
people greater control over the judiciary . 22 
Displeasure with the judicial branch in California stemmed from 
several sources. The greatest grievance against the courts was their 
usurpation of t he legislative function. This charge against the judi-
ciary had its origin in the case of Houghton v. Austin . The Supreme 
Court in 1874 had declared unconstitutional the acts of the legislature 
of California providing for the collection of state taxes . 23 
19Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45. 
20Adair v . United States , 208 U. S. 161. 
--- . 
21As cited in Hinfred A. Harbison and Alfred H. Kelly. The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Deve lopment;_ (New York: H. H. Norton and 
Company, I nc . , 1963), p. 628 . 
22Rallo~ Arguments of 1911. Government Publications Department, 
California State Library, Sacramento, California. Rare state election 
document \'lhich is a one-page fold- out brochure . 
23uought0l~ v . Austin, L•7 Cal. 6/f6. 
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So strong were t he r epercussions of this decision it prompted 
State Senator Lee Gates and Assemblyman William Clark to write 17 
years later: "In truth, s o overshadm.;ring is the control of the judi-
ciary over legislation that it is almost a misnomer to speak of the 
. 2L legislature as the lmv-making branch of the government ." f It was also 
charged on the Senate floor in 1911 tha t big business had influenced 
the court ' s decision.25 This charge linked one of the most highly 
res pected branches of government with machine politics and vested 
interests. Both wer e anathema to Progressives . 
It was argued by some in California that if the judicial branch 
encroached upon l egislative powers it should also be subject to r ecall . 
This concept \ •Tas presented to the el ectorate in the Voters Handbook of 
1911: 
Titis power to r emove dishonest or incapable servants is a 
power which has not been greatly questioned except as relates 
to the judiciary . Hut judges , especially those of the Supreme 
Court, by construing the acts of the legislature perform acts 
of l egislation as truly as does the legislature.26 
The recall measure \vas first introduced for consideration into the 
California Sena t e on January 20, 1911, by Senator Lee Gates of Los 
Angeles. It was then referred to the Senate judiciary committee for 
consideration . Once in the committee a heated debate ens ued over the 
provis ion of judicial s usceptibility to the recall. No s ingl e aspect 
of the initiative, referendum, and recall stirred more controversy than 
24\.Jilliam C. Cl ark and Lee C. Gates . Pro_~ed Amendments to the 
Cons titution _9f the State of California with Legislative Reasons for and 
Agains t Adoption (October, 1911) . 
25The charge was made by Charles S. \,TJ1ee1er. Los Angeles Time~, 
February 4, 1911. 
26M. Fay Coughlin . California Voters Handbook of 1911, p. 44. 
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provisions for recall of the judicial brancl1. Nationally, Roosevelt 
had spoken out for its adoption into the Progressive program of r eform . 
President Taft \vas, hmvever , adamantly opposed to r ecall of t he judi-
ciary. So unpalatable \vas recall of judges to him that he held up 
Arizona ' s statehood until the provision was removed from its Constitu-
tion. Taft ' s sentiment was typical of the faction in California which 
opposed r ecall of the judicial branch. Such a position was stated by 
Taft in The Outlook: 
. . . there could not be a system better adopted to deprive 
the judiciary of that independence \vithout \vhich the liberty 
and other rights of the individual cannot be maintained against 
the government and the majority.27 
Generally the recurr ing theme of the opponents of judicial recall 
\vas the need for an independent judiciary free from \vhimsical public 
pressures. This \<las echoed by the American Bar Association \vhich in 
1911 adopted a r esolution condemning the r ecal l of judges and led an 
active campaign against its adoption . 
Locally, Hiram Johnson was adamant about recall of the judiciary . 
He proclaimed that " so far as the r ecall is concerned , did the solution 
of the matter rest "~>lith me , I \.Jould apply it to every official. u28 
A typical reaction on the part of those opposed to judicial 
recall is represented by A. F; Harrison in an essay read before the 
Chi t Chat Club of San Francisco, July 10, 1911 . Referring to recall 
of the judicia ry he said: 
To my mind the grea t es t danger i n this reform lies in the 
f act tha t it is an ill-considered assault upon the most delicate 
part of our governmental machinery, and tends to destroy the 
27As cited in The Outlook (Hay 23 , 1912), p . 604 . 
28sacramento Bee, January L,, 1911 . 
independence and courage of the judiciary, in whom the quality 
of independence and fearlessness has been heretofore considered 
of the most vi tal necessity in protecting the Llberty and sec-
urity of a free people.29 ~ 
The recall bill was introduced into the California legislature 
where debate within t he Senate Judiciary Committee \vas not unlike 
public reaction tmvard the measure . The Senate conm1ittee represented 
a microcosm of those opposed and those favoring recall. 
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Senator Wright led the dissenters in the main committee action 
over the issue of excluding the j udges from . the recall bill. The 
first victory for recall came on February 17, \vhen by a vote of 10 to 
3 the committee adopted the Gates recall amendment and moved it onto 
the Senate f loor. 
Once on the Senate floor , State Senators Wright and Wolfe imme-
diately initiated the opposition . Wright proposed an amendment \·Ihich 
would delete from the Gates measure recall of the judiciary . It was 
defeated 29 to 11. 
The debate of r ecall \vithin the Senate \vas heated and thorough, 
but the bill was eventually adopted by a comfortabl e vote of 36 to 
four. The Cal ifornia Progessi ves had won round t\vo . 
The Assembly opposition gave recall much the same treatment as 
Senators Wright and Wolfe , even to the point of using identical argu-
ments and stalling tactics . Defeating the opposition, the Progressives 
on }1arch 6 , maneuvered the amendment out of the Assembly Commit tee on 
Direct Legislation with a recommendation that it be adopted . 
After the measure was out of committee, Assemblyman N. R. Jones of 
Contra Costa County introduced a motion that would have excluded 
29t.. . F . Norrison, "The Recall of Judges, " (An essay read before the 
Chit Chat Club of San Francisco, July 10, 1911) . 
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justices of the State Supreme Court, justices of the District Court of 
Appeal, and Superior Court judges from recall. Support of the Jones 
Amendment was composed of t~oJ"O factions, those \llho opposed recall in any 
form, and those Progressives tllho opposed recall of the judiciary . 
After a day of vigorous debate, the Jones Amendment was defeated by 
59 to 20. 30 
Few l egisla tive measures have been given more consideration than 
the recall amendment. According to Franklin Hichborn, "Never before 
. had a measure before the California Legislature been so thoroughly 
studied and discussed . . .. "31 It seems likely that the issues 
involving the recall concept \vere completely aired . The opposition 
was given full opportunity during the P~ogres sive reform campaign to 
respond and raise considerations they thought were important. 
The sentiment in . the California State Legislature on the recall 
amendment of 1911 \vas ovenoJ"helmingly in favor of its adoption. One 
hundred and six l egislators voted for the amendment and fourteen 
against it . 
Le~is lative Intent and the Campaign of 1911. On the eve of the 
1906 election the Fresno Republican stated that . "The man to win will 
be the man \vho makes his appeal direct . to the people . " 32 This \lias the 
30I am indebted to Franklin Hichborn for the account of the recall 
measure in its various l egisl ative s t ages . This discussion \-las based 
upon his book, Story~ the ~3lifornia Legislature~ 1911 (San 
Fra ncisco : J ames H. Barry Company, 1911), pp . 123-138 . 
31Hichborn, p. 137. 
32The California state l egis lature does not publish its debates , 
keep committee reports, or record legislative hearings . The absence 
of such information makes the establishment of official meaning, more 
commonly knmm as legislative intent, rather difficult . 
The particular problem of establishing intent with regard to recall 
in California is especi a lly difficult because its original enactment 
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theme that four years later dominated the campaign of lliram Johnson 
for the office of governor. 
During the Johnson campaign of 1910 little was said of direct 
legis lation and almost no mention was made of the recall. Not until 
the close of the 1910 legislative session did the governor begin his 
campaign for initiative, referendum, and recall.33 In his inaugural 
address J ohnson spelled out his stand on direct legislation and intro-
duced certain themes which "'ere to remain consistent throughout public 
debate by the proponents of recall during the l egis l at i ve reform cam-
paign of 1911. He proclaimed in the address that those who espoused 
the measures of direct legis lation and recall did so because of a 
deep rooted belief in popular government and not only in 
the right of the people to govern but in their ability to govern 
. if the people have the right, the ability and the intel-
ligence to elect, they have , as 'vell, the right, ability and 
intelligence to reject or to recall; and this applies v1ith equal 
force to 'an administrative or a judicial officer .34 
in 1911 'vas too early fo r the California's Legislative Service Conmlission 
to have reported on. Contained in the Legislative Service Commission 
are reports establishing legislative intent of specific measures. 
Though difficult, establishment of intent is not entirely impossible. 
Pollack's Fundamenta l s of Legal Research [En~in H. Pollack, Fundamentals 
~Legal Research, third edition (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 
1967), pp. 341-342] suggests several official as well as unofficial 
sources by which official intent might properly be determined . These 
sources include: texts, pamphlets, and periodicals containing discussion 
of the bill before or af ter its enactment; newspapers covering the period 
when the bill \vas under consideration and debate ; 'vhere it can be 
established the state copied another bill; and genera l events that might 
shed light upon the bill ' s original meaning and its author ' s interpre-
tation. 
The attempt by this section to establish official intent of the 
1911 recall measure shall be guided by the principles as stated in 
Pollack's text which is used in most major American schools of l aw . 
33quoted in Michae l P. Rogin and John L. Shover. Political Change 
in California: Critical Elections and Social Movements, 1890-1966 
(Hestport: Greemvood Publishing CorporatiOl;-:-· 1969), p. 9-6-.- ---
34outlook, February 10, 1912 , p. 317 . 
The Sacramento llee responded to Johnson ' s comments by ~"riting 
tha t his inaugural message should be regarded as one of the "highest 
tributes ever paid 'The People of California. '"35 This was a very 
popular theme and was not only characteristic of the California 
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Progressives , but was typica l of the mood which permeated the na tiona l 
Progressive movement. It seems likely that Johnson and his fellm" 
Progressives were perhaps t aking their cues from the national l eaders 
such as Theodore Roosevelt. 
The re has been some controversy as to the role Johnson played 
in formulating his platform of direct legis lation . EdHard Dickson, 
one of Johnson ' s intima te politica l aides and a former newspape r editor, 
believed that Johns on had little knmo1ledge or understanding of the 
recall measure until l a te in his 1910 campaign.36 In his address at 
Blanchard Hall in Los Angeles, June 3, 1910, Johnson condemned the evils 
of the political system and promised to put control of institutions 
into the hands of the people, but he made no mention of r ecall . 37 Most 
of his speeches during the 1910 campaign make no refe rence t o recall . 
Johnson's inaugural address contains his first public remarks on the 
r ecall. 
35s acr amento Bee, January 4, 1911. 
36rntervie~., ~"ith Edward A. Dickson by George Mowry , June 25, 19L,8, 
as cited by Mmo1ry in The California Progressives (Berkel ey : University 
of California Press , 1951), p. 135 . 
37Full t ext of the s peech can be found bound in volume 6 of California 
Speeches (#13, p. 12) at the California State Library. 
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In the October , 1914, issue of ~veryhody ' s Magazine , Denver 
police commissione r and controvers i a l propag3ndist, George Creel , 
suggested that J ohns on had only "glib familiarity \<li th the i nitia tive, 
refer endum, and r ecall. " 38 
In r esponse to this scathing attack on the progr essive creden-
tials of Johnson, Dr. J ohn R. Haynes r eplied that Johns on had spent 
"days in ass isting in the drafting" of some of the mos t i mpor tant 
r e form measures.39 Haynes, a long with Johnson's aide, Edward Dickson, 
are credited \<lith drafting the democrat i zing amendments to t he s tate · 
cons titution. 
It was Dr. Haynes who first introduce d to the United St ates 
recall in its modern form by way of the Los Ange l es City Charter of 
1903. Haynes worked incessantly on reform proposal s for the cit y and, 
subsequently, the state. 
According to Bird and Ryan, Haynes had spent sever a l years 
observing mismanagement and corruption in Philadelphia politics. He 
concluded from his observations that the ''ordi nary poli t ical panaceas 
were of no avail, tha t the e lection of good men to office was an 
accomplishment only spasmodically achieved. "40 It \<las from his 
experiences in Philadelphia that led Haynes to search for meaningful 
political reforms. 
38ceor ge Cree l, "\.Jhat About Hiram Johnson ," Everybody ' s Hagazine , 
31:458 , Octobe r, 1914. 
39sacramento .!!.ee, October 10, 1941. 
40Bird and Ryan , p. 24 . 
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There is no traceable evidence that the existence of recall in 
Switzerland had any influence on its adoption in California.41 In fact , 
Haynes denied any kno,vledge of the SHiss model and held that he 
received the idea from reading The _City for the People, by Frank 
Parsons.42 The relevant passage which must have influenced Haynes, 
and thus prompted him to draft California recall measures, deals \vi th 
democracy and direct controls on the representative system: 
What we want is not a body of legislators beyond the reach 
of the people ..• , but a body of legislators subject at all 
times to the peopl es ' direction and control . ... 
It is good to choose strong men to manage municipal and 
state affairs, but it is well too to provide the means to hold 
them in check or make them move at the peoples' \vill. . . . 
The solution lies in a representative system guarded by constitu-
tional provisions for popular initiative, adoption, veto, and 
recall.43 
From 1901 to 1911 Haynes lobbied fervently for concepts of direct 
· democracy and direct legislation at every session of the California 
l egislature . 44 There was no one in California more dedicated to 
seeing principles of direct legislation, as proposed by the Progressives, 
enacted into lmv than Haynes. 
41It should be noted, however, that recall had been in existence 
at the statewide level in Oregon since 1908. The Sacramento Bee on 
January 4, 1911 reported that Johnson adopted the Oregon Plan. There 
i s , however, little evidence to indica te that the Oregon r ecall had 
any appreciable influence in California. 
The recall in California developed from its mvn indigenous poli-
tical s ituation and was au thored by men who evidently did not consult 
the Oregon Plan at great l ength. 
42cited in Hilliam E. Rappard, "The Initiative , Referendum, and 
Recall in S\vitzerland, " The Annals .2.!_ the American Academy of Politica l 
and Social Science, 43:U0-145, September, 1912. 
43Frank Parsons . The ~l.J:y for the People (Philadelphia: C. F. 
Taylor, 1901), p . 256. 
4L1V. 0 . Key and \Huston Crouch . Initiative an<i_ _!(eferendum in 
California (Berkeley: University of California, 1939), p . 425 . 
22 
All evidence r .oints to Edward Dickson as being Haynes ' assistant 
in drafting of the recall measure. Dickson, who was once a prominent 
political correspondent before becoming editor of the ~os Ange]-es 
Express, helped launch the reformist Lincoln-Roosevelt League in the 
spring of 1907. The league represented a movement in the Republican 
party to cleanse California politics of Southern Pacific domination . 
Dickson, according · to Geo,rge Mmvry, planted the whole idea of initia-
tive, referendum, and recall in the Johnson program. Apparently it 
was initially Dickson ' s encouragement in the early part of 1910 that 
prompted Johnson to include recall in the reformist campaign, and it 
was mainly Haynes, Hho, 'vith Dickson:, drafted the actual recall 
amendment. Both claimed Johnson had a hand in the actual drafting 
of the measure.45 
Proponents of recall on the eve of the 1911 special election 
argued that the purpose of recall 'vas to " introduce into public life 
,.;rhat is indispensable in private and business life . . . . the poHer 
to remove a dishonest , incapable , or unsatisfactory servant . "46· It 
should be noted that grounds for recall were left quite general and 
not limited to definite l egal qualifications . 
Senator Lee Gates, the author of the Senate recall amendment , 
suggested that the purpose of recall was to make the '' creator greater 
45noth men came to Johnson' s defense following the appearance of 
George Creel ' s article in Everyb~~ Magazine a ttacking Johnson and 
inferring that he was a phony Progressive . Haynes and Dickson made 
statements to the contrary as cited in the Sacramento Bee , October 10, 
191L •. 
46quoted from " Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the State 
of California with Legislative Reasons for and Against Adoption," 
October, 1911. 
than the creature" by "taking hack the arbitrary pm\ler '"hich the 
creature ha d arrogated to itself."47 
The major reason given by the opponents of recall, other than 
objections over r ecall of judges , \\las the concern tha t tyranny 1\lould 
prevail if the majori ty could control actions of elected offi cial s .48 
This argument was inef fec tual in the f ace of gr and and e l oquent argu-
ments for pu t ting greater f ai th in the people. It seemed that any 
opposition ef fort to r ecall \\las innocuous when compared with the 
Johnson machine tha t r eplaced the increasingly vulnerab l e Southern 
Pacific . 
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The people of California responded affirmatively to t he Progr essive 
r eform measures. Hiram Johnson's campaign efforts had been vigorous 
and \\lell execut ed with f e\\1 serious impediments, Needless to say , 
recal l enjoyed a public, statewide forum '"here its intent and conse-
quences could be thoroughly considered . 
Califor nia agr eed to r eform its government and the people ovenvhelm--
ingly endorsed the recall amendment . 49 
Recall as a Panacea. Professor Richard Barne t, writing in his 
book Int~_rven tion an<.!_ Revolution , states that " every revolutionary 
movement i s bas ed upon the myth tha t the r emoval of a man . . . . is 
all that s tands in the \vay of progress and justice . rr50 This i s a 
47cited by Franklin Hichborn. Story of California Legisl ature of 
1911, p. 131. 
48uichborn, p . 131 . 
49 . The final s tatewide vote was 178,115 f or recall and 53 ,755 
against it. 
50Richard Barne t. Interven tion and Revolution (New York: Horld 
Publis hing Company, 1968), p. 38. 
poignant expression of the mood whicl1 permeated the people of California 
in the early twentieth century. The Progressives had turned reform of 
social and political institutions into a moralistic, religious crusade . 
It became a crusade to end injustice and corruption forever. 
Inherent in fervently zealous crusades is often the tendency to 
over-simplify the problem and thereby overestimate the solution. The 
r eliance upon a cure-all is in itself an exampl e of over-simplistic 
behavior . Progressive reformism was based upon the political myth 
of direct democracy. Initiative, referendum, and recall r epresented 
the panaceas to prevailing social ills . 
Progressives led their follm\7ers to the belief that popular rule 
\\70uld correct the corruption, stop the inequities, expose the abuses, 
and marshall the forces of good in soci e ty . This sense of finalty 
was expressed by Johnson's aide upon hearing of the l egislature ' s adop-
tion of r ecall . He exclaimed , 11 Popular gov~rnment in California is at 
last positively and permanently established. 11 51 Such infectious expres·-
sions of hope and optimism were typical. 
William Allen l~hite '"rote that 11 • • • when the people knm\7 ,.,here 
to strike at an evil , they a h\7ays hit it. 11 52 For Progressives the evil 
was represented, in part, by elected officials \\Tho '"ere self-serving 
and who be trayed public trust. The solution \\las in controlling the 
scoundr els , thereby preventing the degeneration of society . 
5lquoted in Los Angeles Express, March 8, 1911 . 
5 2lvilliam Allen Hhi te. The Old _9rder Change th (Nevl York : The 
MacMillan Co . , 1910), p. 47. 
l 
I 
In proposing recall as a panacea the Progressives ackumo1ledged 
one of the oldest political checks on pmo1er lmm·m to man, the people . 
Primacy and asccndency of the people characterized Ute period of 
Progressive reformism in California and throughout the nation . 
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CHAPTER III 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE GENERAL LA~~ 
OF RECALL FOR CITIES 
Pursuant to the 1911 cons titutional amendment providing for the 
recall of elective public officers, the California legis lature passed 
acts to provide for direct l egislation, including recall, by electors 
in the counties and cities throughout the state. 
Article 23, section 13, of the constitution gives the legislature 
authority to establish recall procedures for cities , and the establish-
ment of such provisions by legislative enactment is the general law 
governing the State of California and its various political s ubdivisions . 
Paragraph 14 of Article 23 excludes from the general laH provisions 
cities \'lith charters establishing their own procedures for recall. 
This chapter will r ender a general treatment of the substantive 
statutory deve lopments governing the general l aw of recall. The pro-
vis ions chosen for analysis are those \'lhich have influenced the na ture 
of the law vis-a-vis its original provisions . 
I. CO~ffiNCEMENT OF RECALL PROCEEDINGS 
In 1911 m1der the original municipal recall provisions no public 
officia l could be recalled until he held his office for a t l eas t four 
months . 1 Under the 1911 s t atute this \'las the only s tipulation for the 
l s t atutes of Califo:r.nia, 1911, Ch . 185, p. 359 . 
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recall of any holder of any elective municipal office . This was 
changed, however, in 1931 to require tha t (1) the official sought to 
be recalled must have held his office a t least six months , and (2) no 
recall pe tition could be filed against an officer within a six month 
period of the last filing of s uch pe tition. 2 This version of the 
six-month provision first appeared in 1931--the 1911 l aw provided no 
such r equirement. Changes ,.,ere made in the wording of the la,., during 
the legislative sessions of 1939, 1959, and 1961, but the provision 
has r emained unchanged in its meaning. No specific intent can be 
found for the provis ion. 
It can be assumed that the intent of the legislature was to extend 
the public official's period of grace in which time he could more 
properly prove himself . It also seems apparent that the ne'" provis ion 
was des igned to discourage repeated nuisance r ecall attempts by a llowing 
the official to enjoy a longer period in which h e 'wuld be immune from 
external distractions, such as repeated recall attempts . 3 
Ne,., provis ions to the l a,., in 1931 provided that recall proceedings 
could only take place after a notice of intention had been filed and 
published in the local ne1o~spaper. 4 Apparently the purpose of this pro-
vision was to provide for a greater dissemination of information con-
cerning the issues surrounding the recall attempt and to alert the 
electorate as to the nature of the petition to be circula ted . 
2sta ts., 1931 , Ch. 27LI, p. 563, Sec . 1. 
3The County and City Clerks Association h as apparently played a 
prominent ro l e in reform l egi s l a tion of the recall . This fact will 
be brough t out more clearly l a t er in the chapter . 
4stats., 19 l~. Ch. 274, pp. 563-564, Sec . 2. 
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Need for a more informed public regarding the issues of recall 
elections had a lways been one of the demands of those in favo r of 
reforming the l aw. From its early beginning , recall unden.rent consi-
der able abuse with r egard to the ci r cula tion of petitions and fra ud-
ul ent allegations about the cont ents and na ture of the petitions . 
One of the mos t notorious cases of abuse, for example , Has in 
the Grant recall electi on in San Francisco where investigations have 
disclosed tha t s i gnatures acquired on Grant ' s r ecall petitions were 
achieved by mis representing the nature of the petition in order to 
induce reluctant citizens to sign . 5 
Outraged by the abuse of recall and misconduct of its proponents , 
State Senator Chandler during the 1915 legislative sess ion introduced 
a bill6 Hhich r equired that at the top of each r ecall peti t ion must be 
printed a title describing the nature of the petition and t he name of 
the officer sought to be r ecalled. This provision became l aw and Has 
included in the 1915 statute s as an amendment to the Political Codes 
relating to all initiative, r eferendum, and r ecall petitions. 7 
Chandler a lso introduced l egislation8 making it a f e l ony for 
anyone to use a fict i tious name on any recall petiti on , or to sub-
scribe the name of another . The penalty for t his felony was imprison-
ment in the s t ate prison for not less than one , nor more than fourteen 
years.9 
5Franklin Hichborn , Richboro ' s Legislative Bull e tin (January 20 , 
1915)' p . 3 . 
6senate Bill No. 725 . 
7 S t? t s .. , 1915 , Ch . 4 2 , p . 50 , Sec . 2 . 
Bsenate Hill No . 725 . 




It is interes ting to note that not one vote \\la s cas t agains t any 
of Chandler ' s r e form measures . lO Apparently a strong feeling existed 
s oon after recall ' s i nception tha t it was in gr ea t need of r eform and 
f urther improvement . 
Bird and Ry an r eport that as l a te as 1930 solicitors '"ere often 
guilty of misrepresentation and tha t due to f ees of 10 cents per name 
\•Jhich Here pa id by r ecal l organizers , " few names '"e r e acquired in a 
spirit of good faith and s incerity ."!! 
In the 1931 amendments the notice of intention had to consist 
of a s t atement not in excess of five hundred words giving the reasons 
for t he recall. If t he city did not have a ne\\lspaper of general cir-
culation then the statement was required to be posted in three public 
places . 
The statute also required that one copy of the notice be sent to 
the officer sought to be recal l ed and that one be filed with the city 
clerk . 
These provisions have r emained to the present . Hm\lever, while the 
1931 codes did not provide tha t the ident i ty of the proponents ne ces-
sarily be disclosed, the 1961 amendments to the codes did make such a 
requirement t ha t at l eas t one proponent must be identified by name and 
address . 12 In 1969 this \\las amended so that while one proponent must 
lOrhe information r egarding the introduction of r eform l egi s l ation 
by Senator Chandler is taken f rom Franklin Hichborn, _S tory £!_ the 
California Legi s_!_ature of 1915 (San Francis co: J ames H. Barry Company , 
1915), pp . 103-106. 
11Frederick Bird and Francis Rya~ , The Recall of Public Offi cers : 
Jl Studx_ of the Qperatio~~- of the Reca~_l.!..~ caiilor;ia· (Ne\\1 York: The 
Macl'1i1lan Company , 1930) , p . 22 . 
12stnts . , 1961, Ch . 23, Div. 14, (Ch . 3) , p. 865. 
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identify himself, not more than five names and addresse8 could appear 
on the notice. 13 
The 1931 statutes allmved fourteen days after publication or posting 
of intent in which the officer sought to be recalled could himself 
utilize similar procedures to offer a response to the charges in a 
statement not exceeding 500 ~vords . The period of time ~vi thin which the 
official could answer charges was narrov1ed to seven days in 1957. 14 
According to the 1931 recall lmv, tHenty-one days from the publi-
cation or posting of the notice and statement the petition could be 
circulated for the purpose of gathering signatures. This was also 
changed in 1957 to seven days after publication,l5 thus narrowing the 
Haiting time for the proponents by two-thirds as compared to the 1931 
The 1961 statutes provided that the proponents of a reca l l must 
publish at least once in a newspaper of general circulation copies of 
the notice, statement, and answer or else post the same in three public 
places .l6 The newspaper notice is not posted at the expense of the 
incumbent, but is include d in the official legal notices colmm1 which 
most papers run regularly . 
The lmv was simply clarified in the changes from 1931 to 1969 
regarding the commencement of recall proceedings. The apparent intent 
of the changes ~.Jas to more clearly define special time periods for 
various s tages in the over-all r ecall procedure. However, by doing so , 
13stats., 1969, Ch . 774' p . 1552 . 
14stats., 19~, Ch. 1316, PP· 2637-2638 . 
l5stat_§_., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638 . 
16stats . , 196~, Ch . 23, Div. (Ch . 3) ' p. 866 . 
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the overall effect was to shorten the running time for the proponents, 
thereby making recall somewhat more difficult. 
As previously mentioned, the legislature has shown considerable 
concern that the issues of a recall attempt be made public and full 
information regarding the recall be available prior to the circulation 
of any petition. 
The 1931, 1939, 1957, and 1961 changes have consistently shown an 
interest toward making the election laws more specific and ~ess am-
biguous procedurally. 
II. SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT 
The language of the 1911 recall law for municipalities provided 
that 25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding general municipal 
election be the required amount of signatures on a petition.17 
This particular provision was poorly worded and left the law 
vague as to its true meaning. The provision could have been construed 
to mean that twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast within the 
city, rather than the vote cast for the specific office from which 
the officer was sought to be recalled. 
Proper clarification of this statute exists in the State Consti-
tution where it requires that until otherwise provided by law no city 
could require a recall petition to be signed by "electors more in 
number than 25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election 
for all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to be 
removed occupies.rrl8 
17stats., 1911, Ch. 185, pp. 359-360, Sec. 10. 
18see the California State Constitution, Article XXIII, Sec. 14. 
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It is inconceivable that the 1911 act providing for recall of 
municipal corporations would have a different percentage requirement 
for the recall petition than the requirement in the constitutional 
amendment of the same year . 
It is significant to note that this is the only provision which 
the constitution specifically makes for general law cities. It is 
also noteworthy that the signature requirement for elective public 
officers of the state is 12%-13% less than for municipal offices. 
It has been suggested that the criteria for higher signature require-
ments for recall from non-statewide offices was the fear that local 
officers would be subjected to a greater number of recall attempts 
because relatively few signatures would be required in sparsely popu-
lated areas to satisfy more lenient state-wide requirements. 19 
Apparently the drafters of the constitutional amendment providing 
for recall had enough insight into the patterns of local recall behavior 
to make the distinction between municipal and statewide elections a 
substantive part of the constitutional provision. The opportunity 
for making such observations was available in those cities prior to 
1911 which incorpora ted recall into their election procedures. Accord-
ing to Bird and Ryan, between the introduction of recall in the 1903 
Los Angeles City Charter and the enactment of the State Law of 1911, 25 
out of the 31 cities20 under freeholder charters adopted recall procedures. 21 
19Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, California Constitution 
Revis ion Commission (San Francisco , California, 1968), p. 21. 
20Home rule cities that did not adopt r ecall during this period were : 
Grass Valley, Napa, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Rosa, and Watsonville. 
2lBird and Ryan, p. 58. 
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The widespread popularity of recall in cities prior to its state-
wide acceptance in 1911 was due, in part, to the successful outcome of 
the 1904 Davenport recall held in Los Angeles. The removal of the city's 
mayor by recall methods employed in the 1903 Los Angeles charter was 
hailed with general satisfaction throughout the state.22 
Another reason has been given for the considerable difference 
in signature requirements for state and city officials . Apparently, 
in spite of the reformist Progressive zeal in the early 20th century, 
recall attempts for trivial reasons were frowned upon by most of the 
people . It \-Tas recognized, state Bird and Ryan, that "recall was to 
be invoked only in extreme cases"--as a last resort.23 It was felt that 
any recall movement had to be supported by a sizable body of responsible 
citizens in order for recall to be successful . 
Not all were satisfied with the recall operation. An attack was 
launched by the 1917 legislature against recall, composed of those 
responding to its abuses as well as those who were probably just anta-
gonistic to the concept of recall itself. 
Assemblyman Friedman, from San Francisco, proposed a constitu-
tional amendment24 which would have allowed for counter-petitions in 
the event of a recall attempt. If , for example, a recall petition was 
certified as sufficient, Friedman's bill would have allowed a counter-
petition signed by 10% of the electors to nullify the original petition 
by the proponents, thus blocking the recall election. 25 
22Bird and Ryan, p. 230 . 
23Bird and Ryan, p. 231. 
24Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 78. 
25Franklin Hichborn, ·Hichborn's Legislative Bulletin (March 17, 













EVALUATION OF THE SIGNATURE REQUIRE~ffiNT 
ACCORDING TO THE GENERAL LAW OF RECALL FOR CITIES 
Percentage 
25% of the entire vote cast at the last preceding 
general municipal election** 
25% entire number of votes cast for the office which the 
incumbent sought to be removed occupies at the last 
preceding regular municipal election* 
25% of the entire number of votes cast for all candidates 
for the office held by the incumbent at the last preceding 
regular municipal election 
Same 
12% of the voters of the city 
25% of the voters of the city 
25% of the voters of the city on the day the petition 
is filed 
25% of the voters of the city according to the county 
clerk's last official repor t of registration to the 
Secretary of State 
**The language of the Statute providing for municipal recal l was 
unclear as to its intent . As stated it appears to require 25% of all 
votes cast for all elective offices in the last preceding municipal 
election . This provision is in conflict with section 14 of Article 
XXIII which states that the general law for cities and counties shall 
never exceed 25% "of the entire vote cast at the last preceding elec-
tion for all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to 
be removed occupies." The wording in the general law was evidently 
an oversight on the part of the drafters of the legislation proposing 
t he statute. 
*Here the language and meaning was brought in accordance with 
the constitutional stipulation. 
TABLE I I 
BREAKDOWN OF RECALL PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENT I NTO 
NUMERICAL UNITS FOR ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES 
Number of Percentage of 
Regis t ered Signature 
Vot ers Dates Requirements Based on 
Based on 
100,000 *30% voting 
of 100,000 
registered 
to vote . 
1911- 25% entire 
1935 vote cast for 
office which 
incumbent 
sough t to be 
r emoved oc-
cupies at last 
preceding 
r egular muni -
cupal election . 
1953- 12% of the 
1957 vot er s of the 
city . 
1957- 25% registered 
1971 voters of the 
city. 
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No. Si gnatur e 
;Required 
on Petition 







*Though the 30% figure is somewhat arbitrary, it is based up-
on the median voting turnout in non-partisan American cities as 
reported by Robert Alford and Eugene Lee in "Voting Turnout in 
American Cities," American Politica l Science Review, Vol. .62 ., 
September , 1968, p . 796. 
The effect of such a measure would have rendered the recall 
provision virtually inoperative. While the measure did not pass 
the assembly, it is perhaps significant of mounting displeasure, as 
well as the recall opponent's ability to rally over some aspects of 
the recalL The measure was approved by the Assembly Committee on 
Constitutiona.l Amendments. 26 
The 1931 amendment to the Political Codes clarified the poorly 
worded 1911 lalv providing for the signature requirement and brought 
36 
the general law in accord with the proper constitutional construction. 
In order to avoid further possibility for misunderstanding--so 
it seems, anyway--the wording in the 1931 statute relating to the 
signature requirement for petitions was almost identical to the 
Constitution: 
• which petition shall be signed by qualified voters 
equal in number to at least twenty-five per cent of the entire 
number of votes cast for the office which the incumbent sought 
to be removed occupies, at the last preceding regular muni-
cipal election at which such office was filled by election.27 
The State Constitution reads: 
• • • shall not require any such recall petition to be 
signed by electors more in number than twenty-five per cent 
of the entire vote cast at the last preceding election for 
all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to 
be removed occupies.28 
26Hichborn,. p. 1. 
27stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 563, Sec. 2. 
28caiifornia State Constitution, Article XXIII, Sec. 14. 
we s~gnature requirement remained at the original 25 per 
cent level until 1953. In 1953 the general law was changed to read 
"not less than 12 per cent of the voters of the city.rr29 
It was Assemblyman William C. Berry who authored the bill 
which led to the 1953 change in the petition requirement. 
Theoretically, the 1953 requirement made recall more difficult to 
achieve by an increased signature requirement for recall petitions.30 
While it appears that the 12 per cent provision should have 
tempered recall attempts, this was apparently not the case. Former 
chairman of the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee, 
Charles Conrad, reports that in 1956 and 1957 he was beseiged by 
county and city clerks requesting to have the signature requirement 
raised from 12 per cent of the registered voters to 25 per cent of 
the registered voters. They claimed that recall attempts had 
gotten out of hand and had become a de finite nuisance r ather than 
a responsible exercise in the democratic process.32 
During the period when the 12 per cent signature requirement 
was in effect, recall became a nuisance in a California city where 
political factionalism is uncommonly extreme. While the city, 
Seaside, is a rare case, it serves as an example for those critical 
of the 12 per cent provision. 
29stats., 1953, Ch. 1658, p. 3386, Sec. 1. 
30see Chart B. 
31Robert R. Alford and Eugene C. Lee. "Voting Turnout in 
American Cities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62, 
September , 1968, p. 799. 
32rnterview with Assemblyman Charles J. Conrad (R-56th 
District), June 30, 1971. 
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The city attorney of Seaside, Saul Weingarten, reported that 
the 12 percent requirement did not create a responsible framework 
for recall. He cites examples of nuisance "out" factions who were 
numerous enough to obtain the required 12 percent on the petition, 
yet lacked considerably the 51 percent needed to carry a recall 
election. It was the policy of these groups to hinder and harass the 
city council by seeking recall elections as often as possible until 
they received favored treatment or gained control of municipal govern-
ment.33 
The above illustration, though not a typical example, points to 
a legitimate criticism against general law signature requirements for 
recall petitions. For example, the 12 percent provision which was the 
general law from 1953 to 1957 was politically acceptable and made 
poor law. The 12 percent requirement enabled recall to be initiated 
too easily giving no substantive indication that it could actually be 
achieved. 
The 1957 l egislature amended the election code to provide that a 
petition demanding the recall of an official "shall be signed by not 
less than 25 percent of the voters of the city.34 
As previously mentioned, Assemblyman Charles Conrad was pressed 
by county and city clerk's associations to have the signature require-
ment changed from 12 percent to 25 percent in order that recall would 
33saul M. Weingarten, "Recall Elections in General Law Cities: A 
Consideration of Some Problems Raised by Recall Procedures." Paper 
delivered to City Attorney's Department, League of California Cities, 
1956, proceedings, p. 3. 
34 . Stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2637. 
become a more "sincere endeavor."35 Conrad believes that it was an 
incident in Seaside which prompted the campaign to have recall harder 
to achieve. The incident, according to Conrad, was one in which pro-
ponents of a recall were in the streets gathering signatures and 
making a "nuisance" of themselves only a few days after a recall 
election had failed. This does not seem likely--or. at least it was 
not a substantial political threat (admittedly a nuisance) for the 
law did not allow recall proceedings to take place until six months 
after filing of the last petition.36 
The 1957 la\-7 made the signature requirement considerably more 
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stringent--by 13 percent--than the 1953 requirement. This represented 
a drastic turn in the law because of the increased difficulty in 
obtaining a validated petition. 
Conrad's amendment to the 1953 signature requirement did not 
represent a reversion to the original general law. Rather, the new 
25 percent provision was based upon 25 percent of the voters of the 
city, while the original 25 percent was based upon votes cast for the 
office at the last election. 
The 1957 law has remained basically unchanged. In 1961, the law 
was clarified narrowing down the definition of the electoral body 
upon which the 25 percent was based. The law read " ••• 25 per cent 
of the voters of the city on the day the petition is filed."37 In 1969 
35Interview with Charles J. Conrad, June 30, 1971. 
36rnterview by Dr. J. B. Briscoe with Mr. Saul Weingarten, former 
City Attorney of Seaside, March 17, 1971. Weingarten alleged that in 
Seaside, the loser of a recall election threatened to bankrupt the city 
by circulating petitions until the continued cost of elections would 
exhaust its funds. 
37stats., 1961, Ch. 23, Div. 14 (Ch. 3), p. 864. 
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it was amended to read, 25 percent of the voters of the city "according 
to the county c l erk ' s last official report of registration to the 
Secretary of State. "38 
III. CIRCULATION OF THE RECALL PETITION 
Neither the State Constitution nor the 1911 municipal election 
law made any provision for setting a specified time limit in which 
signat~res had to be gathered. The law in both cases was silent on 
the matter. 
In 1931, however, a provision was added to the general l aw which 
provided that the proponents of recall had sixty days from the first 
date of publication or posting of the notice of intention before their 
petitions were required to be filed.39 
This did not mean tha t there tvas a sixty-day period in which to 
gather signatures . Rather, it was actually thirty-nine days because 
of a prior passage which stated : "After the expiration of t"tventy-one 
days after the publication or posting of the notice and statement •• • 
the petitions .•• may be circulated . n40 Thus, for t•venty-one 
days within the sixty day period the proponents were unable to gather 
signatures. 
In 1957 an amendment was added to the above s ection clarifying 
it somewhat and making the law easier to understand. The new amend-
ment provided that the recall petition could be circulated and signed 
38stats., 1969, Ch. 940, Sec . 18, p. 1882 . 
39stats ., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 564. 
40stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 564. 
seven days after the initial publication or posting of the notice, 
statement and answer . The officer sought to be recalled had 7 days 
after being notified of the intention of recall, to file an answer 
to the charges.41 
These new provisions theoretically added seven days to the 1931 
provision. Thus, while the 1939 la\v provided for thirty-nine days, 
41 
the 1957 provision allowed forty-six days in which proponents could 
gather signatures. For the large municipalities the task of gathering 
the requisite number of signatu~es in the time required seems an im-
possible feat. A wide variance exists in the general law on this 
point compared with such home-rule cities as Stockton, for example , 
which does not have a clear-cut deadline for termination, or Palo Alto, 
which allows ninety days from the filing of the notice of intention. 
An additional provision was added in 1967 stipulating that the 
petition would become void for all purposes if it was not filed within 
the time permitted by law.42 
IV. BALLOT AND NOMINEES 
The 1911 municipal law on recall elections provided that electors 
could vote first, on the issue of the recall itself by placing an X 
after the words "yes" or "no". If the elector wished the officer 
recalled , and so designated on his ballot by the X (as required by 
the statute), he then would vote for one of the candidates whose 
name appeared on the ballot and who would assume the office vacated 
4lstats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638. 
42 Stats., 1967, Ch. 1148, p. 2828. 
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for the remainder of the regular term, should the recall take 
place.43 
The 1931 Amendments to the statutes changed this portion of recall 
law substantially. The procedure for designating whether an officer 
ought to be recalled remained the same . The following section, however, 
read: 
If the recall prevails shall the council fill the vacancy 
or vacancies by appointment or call a special election for that 
purpose? Following the question shall be the words ' By appoint-
ment' and 'By special election ' on separate lines , with a blank 
space at the right of each in which the elector shall indicate 
by stamping a cross (X), his vote for appointment or election.44 
If the recall prevailed and a majority favored the special election, 
it would be held not less than thirty-five nor more than forty days 
after the date of the order. If, however, the special election pro-
cedure was not voted in, then the council would forthwith fill the 
vacancy or vacancies by special appointment. 
Under the 1931 l aw, if electors desired a more direct say in 
government and thereby voted to have a special election for the filling 
of a vacancy, then (1) an additional election was required--adding to 
the inconvenience of the voters and stronger susceptibility to voter 
apathy; and (2) such an election would add a discouraging extra cost 
to the city and tax payers. 
Theprincipleof two elections, one to determine the actual recall 
and the second to elect a successor, if the electorate so desired, 
was not new to the 1931 legislature who made the two-election principle 
part of the general l aw . The concept was first introduced into the 
43stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 361. 
44stats., 1931, Ch. 274, p. 566. 
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1915 legislature in the form of Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 
21. Like the 1931 statute, the proposed amendment provided that in 
recall, two elections would be held rather than one. The first elec-
tion would determine the matter of the recall itself. If the incumbent 
was recalled, a second election would determine the successor .45 
Dr. Haynes and his associates objected strongly to the bill, 
contending that the direct legislation measures were not in need of 
change, rather greater enforcement of the law was needed in 0~der to 
prevent abuse.46 
Haynes suggested that the legislature should alter the constitu-
tional provision, defining more clearly the crimes of abuse and making 
penalties for such abuse more stringent.47 
Haynes was evidently convincing for the Senate Constitutional 
Amendment No. 21 failed to get beyond committee consideration. It 
was, however, passed in statute form in 1931 and made part of the 
general election la\v for cities. 
When the election l aws \v-ere codified, for the first time, in 1939, 
the section relating to the "two elections" principle was amended to 
provide for the identical procedure as required in 1911--a single 
recall election, where official is recalled and nominee is elected. 
One difference in the law from the original 1911 provision was 
the clarification that "if a majority or exactly half of those voting 
on the question of the recall of any incumbent from office vote 'No', 
45Franklin Hichborn, Story of the California Legislature of 1915, 
pp. 103-106. 
46Hichborn, pp. 103-106. 
47Hichborn, pp. 103-106. 
the incumbent shall continue in office."48 This one election concept 
has remained unchanged to the present. 
V. SUFFICIENCY AND VALIDITY OF CHARGES 
44 
It was not merely corruption that prompted the movement for 
recall; rather the major catalyst was a desire to put political matters 
in the hands of the people rather than the courts and legislature. 
This sentiment is reflected in the 1911 law regarding the sufficiency 
of form or substance in the statement on the grounds for recall: "Any 
insufficiency of form or substance in such statement shall in no wise 
affect the validity of the election and proceedings held thereunder."49 
The revised passage in the 1961 statqtes covering the same section 
reads: "The statement and answer are intended solely for the informa-
tion of the voters and no sufficiency in the form or substance thereof 
shall affect the validity of the election or proceedings."50 
The provision regarding the nature and validity of grounds for 
recall has consistently r emained in a liberal, nonrestrictive form and 
has not been redirected from its original intent. 
The theoretical latitude of the law has consistently been a major 
point of contention in the continuing dispute over recall. In 1911 
the main criticism expressed by the opponents of recall, other than 
the issue of damaging the judiciary, was the absence of specific 
grounds for recall. It was felt by those who led the fight against 
48stats., 1939, Ch. 26, Div. 13 (Ch. 3), p. 30 . 
49stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p . 360 . 
50stats., 1961, Ch. 23, p. 866. 
recall in 1911 that it was a dangerous and radical tool which lacked 
specific charges of misconduct, malfeasance , or corruption.Sl 
Bird and Ryan report that criticism against the "inadequate 
and meaningless" charges often used in recall petitions prompted a 
growing sentiment tha t charges should be made more specific and sub-
stantial. 52 
45 
The current debate on this matter is similar in nature, emphasizing 
the need for specifically defined charges as grounds for recall in the 
hope that this would make recall a more "responsible" procedure. A 
strong proponent for incorporating specific charges of misfeasance, 
malfeasance, and non-feasance in recall law is Assemblyman James Hayes 
from Long Beach. Hayes contends that the section on recall was the 
most crudely drawn part of the state constitution and should be revised.S3 
One is impressed with the notion that the framers of the recall 
amendment had intended that grounds for recall be left open for liberal 
construction. The constitutional version of this section reads: 
Such petition shall contain a general s tatement of the 
grounds on which the r emoval is sought, which s tatement is 
intended solely for the information of the electors and the 
sufficiency of which shall not be open to review.54 
The las t six words of the above passage are the key to a 
proper unders tanding of the original intent. Recall was originally 
enacted primarily out of displeasure over the judiciary . Progressives 
51Ballot Argument for and Against Recall, October, 1911 (On file in 
the California State Library, Documents and Government Publication) . 
52Bird and Ryan, p . 325 . 
53Interview with Assemblyman J ames Hayes, January 19, 1971. 
54california State Constitution, Amendment 23, Sec . 2. 
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hoped that the threat of r ecall would exercise some control over its 
actions which had, prior to 1911, been considered highly improper and 
beyond bounds of judicial discretion and restraint. The progressives 
and fellow reformers believed that the validity and sufficiency of 
grounds for recall should be left to the people and not open to review 
by the courts. In order that court battles not develop over this 
area of recall, the grounds and sufficiency of charges against an 
official were to be political, as the revised Michigan constitution 
so eloquently states,55 rather than of a judicial nature. 
It has also been suggested that the prohibition against judicial 
review expedites action on the petition without the delay that court 
involvement would necessarily cause.56 
The liberal nature of this section also points to an inherent 
distrust of government on the part of the reform-minded Progressives 
who introduced the recall concept into California government . A con-
sequence of this distrust of government was a rekindled faith in the 
judgment and ability of the people. Thus, the question of the grounds 
for recall was left solely in the hands of the people who were the 
supreme and final judges. 
VI. SUBMISSION TO LEGISLATIVE BODY; 
ORDER FOR SPECIAL ELECTION 
The original 1911 provisions for municipal r ecall stipul ated 
that upon determining sufficiency of the petition, the clerk must 
55The revised ~lichigan Constitution , Article II, Sec . 8, states: 
"The sufficiency of any statement of reasons or grounds procedurely 
required shall b e a political rather than a judicial question." 
Cited in the State of Michigan Manual (1963-1964), p. 36. 
56Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, California Constitutional 
Revision Commission , May, 1968, pp. 18-19. 
submit it to the government body without delay. The government body 
was to call a special election for the purpose of recall within not 
less than thirty-five nor more than forty days after the date for 
calling the election. However, if a general municipal election was 
to occur within sixty days, the city council, for example, could in 
its discretion pos tpone the special r ecall election to the general 
election or any general election occuring less than thirty-five days 
after the order for the recall to be held.S7 
The law was amended substantially in 1957 to provide that the 
municipal legis lative body order the special recall election to occur 
not less than sixty nor more than seventy-five days after the date 
47 
of the initial order. Also included in the amendment was the pro-
vision that the legislative body could have the recall election held 
on the day of the regular municipal election if it was to fall within 
not more than ninety and no l ess than s i x ty days from the date of the 
order .58 
The amendment of 1957 increased the discretionary powers of the 
municipal governing body by giving them a newly expanded time limit 
in which they had to call the special election and an increased time 
period in which a general election might occur, in which case the 
recall could then be deferred. 
The section was again amended in 1970 ext ending the period in 
which the l egislative council of a city was required to call a special 
recall election to no l ess than seventy-four nor more than eighty-
nine days after the date of the order. 
57stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 360. 
58stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2638. 
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If the regular election is scheduled not more than 104 nor less 
than seventy-four days from the date of the order, then the body has 
the discretion to defer the recall until the regular election.59 
This amendment extended by fourteen days the beginning and ending of 
periods for conduct of a special election or consolidation with a 
regular election. 
The 1970 amendment remains in the spirit of the 1957 amendment 
in that it gives more discretionary power to municipal legislative 
bodies than the original law had provided. Pressure from city regis-
trars and clerks was the major catalyst for the procedure changes . 
State Senator Whetmore who introduced Senate Bill 1421 calling 
for the election reform stated that city registrar's and clerks com-
plained that they needed more time for the performance of clerical 
duties.60 
The purpose of this r ecent change in the general election law was 
to make election procedures more efficient, less costly, and give 
more time to city officials in the execution of their administrative 
functions. This action was prompted by the 1970 June primary "fiasco" 
where many voters in the Los Angeles area and throughout the state 
failed to receive their sample ballots,61 Whetmore's legislation 
was not aimed specifically at recall, but to elections in general 
whereby cities were accorded ten additional days of discretion in 
59stats., 1970, Ch. 615, p. 1218. 
60rnformation gathered from an interview with Blanche Flanner, 
·administrative assistant to Senator Whetmore, June 30, 1971. 
6lrnterview with Blanche Flanner , June 30, 1971. 
\ 
calling special elections. The intent of the bill was nothing more 
than a hope for more efficient, effective, and economical procedures. 
49 
Some observa tions are essential to properly understand why such 
discretionary power to municipal governing bodies can be a substantial 
issue and may represent an alteration of original intent. Just as 
grounds for recall were not to be judged by a court, so t oo , perhaps, 
such discretion of when an election is to be held--especially if it 
favors those sought to be recalled--was not meant to be given LO a 
municipal governing body. 
Municipal recall attempts usually involve members of city councils. 
These same "municipal legislative bodies" have been given increased 
discretionary authority to postpone an election that might appear 
inimical to the councils' best interests or a council member's interest. 
Implied in such a situation is an obvious conflict of interest. 
Postponement of a special election might very well be in the 
best interes t of the officer whose recall is sought. He could count 
on the extension of time to erase memories of the charges and launch 
an all-out public relations campaign to rectify his image. He would 
have a dis tinct advantage in his access to the media and other public 
relations channels due to his position as office holder and public 
servant. 
Recall movements are generally not tightly or well organized and 
tend to dissipate through time. Most proponents of recall are average 
citizens with jobs and responsibili ties that must be given their 
greatest attention. Having to extend their recall campaign for sev-
eral more weeks i n order to keep pace with the public relations campaign 
of the person sought to be recalled would work an unfair bias and 
hardship upon common proponents of recall. 
In cases of recall ~-lith a member of their body, councils and 
boards of trustees often are in sympathy with the member sought to 
be recalled and will stall by the use of various legal t actics in 
order to subvert recall proceedings. 
50 
Ample opportunity exists for councils to delay or obstruct recall 
proceedings in desperate bids for either more time or dismissal of 
the charges. Bird and Ryan point out that in the early days following 
the passage of recall many attempts were terminated by litigation.62 
They suggested that the means by which recall could be thwarted was 
· SO easy that anyone not taking advantage of them was simply ignorant 
of the history of recall procedures. 
While the legislature has taken note of recall abuses by the 
"out" factions, it has taken little note of abuses by municipal poli-
tical elites which hold greater leverage and have more effective 
resources at their disposal. The trend--though perhaps not aimed at 
recall elections per se-- added dis cretionary powers for the calling 
of special elections by city councils,does not fit the spirit of recall's 
original intent. It does, however, reflect the needs and demands of 
a political system whose complexities have virtually required the 
primacy of efficiency. Original intent, it seems, has been sacri-
ficed for the current pressures of thrift and effectiveness--qualities 
essential to contemporary democratic politics. 
62Bird ·and Ryan, p. 313. 
CHAPTER IV 
DEVELOPMENT OF RECALL IN THE COURTS 
This chapter will examine the development of the general aspects 
of recall within the context of case law and judicial interpretation. 
The constitutional validity of recall will be discussed within a 
historical framework emphasizing its various legal ramifications. 
The legal development as presented through the use of court 
' decisions and judicial interpretation is included for the areas 
covering validity for grounds of recall, the signature requirement 
for recall petitions, general procedural technicalities , certain 
restrictions in the recall law, and the various clerical duties and 
responsibilities under the jurisdiction of the city clerk and municipal 
legislative council. 
I. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF RECALL IN THE COURTS 
In any field as politically explosive as recall, it is difficult 
to legislate clearly. This has been particularly true in California. 
Confusion was created by the multiplicity of laws dealing with the 
procedures of recall in charter cities, counties, and districts·. The 
lal-7 lacked uniformity and was not clearly understood by the average 
layman. 
Reflecting the difficult task that faced the courts over interpre-
tation of the law, the supreme court in the early twentieth century 
warned: 
51 
Our complicated system of city government, which gives 
each city above a certain size power to adopt a charter for 
its own government, and our numerous statutes relating to and 
providing for the recall of elective officers, tend to create 
a great confusion on the subject, and when a decision of the 
court is resorted to the particular city and particular law 
on which the decision is predicated; Otherwise the legal pro-
fession is likely to be misled in regard to the construction 
of the particular law in controversy .! 
Because litigation was relatively easy there was plenty of 
52 
opportunity for the courts to give it an adequate hearing. According 
to Bird and Ryan litigation so frequently accompanied recall movements 
that resort to the courts became one of the unique features of the 
Recourse through the courts by an officer whose recall was being 
sought became a natural and understandable tactic. Any delay in the 
proceedings is certainly to the incumbent's advantage. Temporary 
suspension of the momentum in a recall drive exploits one of the in-
herent weaknesses of popular government--public apathy. Any delay due 
to litigation proceedings usually blunts the issues of political 
conflict.3 
The most common procedures for obstructing recall proceedings 
are, according to former Secretary of State Pat Sullivan , fairly 
simple.4 The incumbent or incumbents, if such are on the city council 
for example, may influence a majority of the body to refuse action 
lwright v. Engram, 186 c. 659 (1921). 
2Frederick L. Bird and Francis M. Ryan. The Recall of Public Officers: 
A Study of the Operation of Recall in Califor;Ia (New York : The MacMillan 
Company, 1930), p. 313 . 
3Bird and Ryan, p. 314. 
4rnterview with Pat Sullivan, January 14, 1971. 
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on the special election. Often council members simply ignore the 
petition calling for a special recall election. When such situations 
exist, the proponents of recall file a writ of mandate to compel the 
municipal legislative body to call a special election for the purpose 
of recalling a public official . The respondent--which is the city 
council--then w~ll often file a demurrer to the recall petition 
taking excepti on to the sufficiency of some point in law in the 
recall procedure, e. g ., insufficient signatures on the petition. The 
writ of mandate is issued by a court of law commanding the performance 
of some specific duty, e. g., calling for the special election. 
It appears that the legislature's intent was to keep matters of 
direct legislation out of the courts as much as possible. Suspicion 
and distrust of the courts was one of the primary catalysts for the 
recall plan, yet in the actual practice of affairs , the courts have 
been called in to obstruct or to order recall elections. 
Direct legislation was also inaugurated because the state legis-
lature was not properly fulfilling its function as a legislative body.S 
To make up for this deficiency it was hoped that the initiative, 
referendum, and recall would give the people a greater voice in the 
affairs of government . Ironically , within two decades, recall became 
controlled by the ve ry political agencies it was created to check.6 
While the early trend in recall decisions at the appeals level 
started out quite liberal, there has been a recent trend turning 
Sit was felt that courts were usurping this function. 
6The 1931 legislature passed considerable amounts of legislation 
dealing with recall and was subsequently to continue making change s 
and additions to the law. 
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toward a strict construction of the law. This will be dealt with 
more specifically later in the chapter. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF RECALL 
The first case involving recall in an American court received 
a favorable ruling. Judge Frank D. Oster of the Los Angeles Superior 
Court stated in his 1904 opinion that recall is "entitled to receive 
a liberal construction" and tha t the recall scheme 'tvas fully consti-
tutional. 7 
Three years later the court in Good v. Common Council 5 C. A. 265 
(1907) upheld the constitutionally of recall and introduced an inter-
esting concept to the interpretation of recall. The court in justi-
fying its conclusions regarding the constitutional validity of recall 
introduced into its decision the well recognized rule that the "agency 
may be terminated at any time by the sovereign power without r eason 
given."8 
This subscribed to the progressive principle of "peopl e as sover-
eign" and contributed to a liberal construction of r ecall and its 
relationship to concepts of direct democracy. The principle of agency--
"may be terminated • • • without reason given"--also provides considerable 
insight into the philosophy providing a general and liberal construction 
for the grounds of recall.9 
7Quoted in the Los Angeles Express, August 29, 1904. Cited in 
Bird and Ryan, pp. 315-316. 
8Good v. Common Council 5 C. A. 265, 269 (1907). 
9Further mention r e lating to the grounds for recall will be made in 
another section of the chapter. 
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The court in Good v. Common Council supra, engaged in some philo-
sophising in their opinion, contributing early to an interpretation 
that was to be relied upon by the courts following the 1911 addi tion 
of recall to the general law. 
The fixing of the tenure of office of the officers of a 
municipality subject to removal by the body that elected them 
is comparatively new in our system of government, and the inter-
pretive branch of the law is in r a ther an undeveloped state on 
the subject. A responsible government, however, is the very 
foundation of the republican system, and there appears no reason 
why a representative should not be made t o retire at any time 
at the reques t of the people ••• , 10 
The cour t was clearly expressing sentiments which were soon to 
become the political maxims of progressives throughout the state and 
nation. No more clear expression, however, of progressive sentiment 
could be found than in this sentence of the court's decision: 
Offices are created by the people for administration of 
public affairs and not for the benefit of the office-holder , 
and r evocable a t the pleasure of the authority creating them, 
unless such authority is limited by the power which conferred 
it.ll 
It can be seen that even before its s tatewide adoption recall 
was deemed to be in accord with the constitution and established 
legal principles. As innovativel2 a procedure as it apparently was, 
recall met with little opposition with respect to its constitutional 
validity. 
Los Angeles Councilman J. P. Davenport, in the first case of 
recall to reach an American court, contended that the recall concept 
was in violation of the U • . s. Constitution regarding due process of 
lOGood v. Common Council, supra, 267, 268. 
11The court relied upon Attorney General v. Jochin, 99 Mich. 358 , 
p. 269, for this principle, 
l2critics of recall would have said r adical. 
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law. As Bird and Ryan point out, Davenport maintained that an office-
holder held property in his office and it could therefore not be taken 
without due process of law.l3 The court declared Davenport ' s argument 
to be inaccurate in that a public office is not property , but a mere 
agency. 
Recall of elective state officers derived its authority direc t ly 
f r om the organic law . Recall in cities lvas provided for by a grant 
of authority included in the provision providing for recall of state 
officials. 
The express provision providing for the recall of city officials 
is found i n Article 23, of the state constitution where it states 
that recal l shall be exercised by the electors of each city of the 
state under the procedure required by law.l4 In the case of charter 
cities , the article provided that in such cases l egislative bodies 
of the respective cities could es tablish their own proceduresl5 or 
coul d , as unchartered cities were required, subscribe to the general 
law of recall as adopted by statutes passed by the legislature to 
facilitate its operation.l6 
The new amendment of 1911 was fully in line with Article 4 of 
the State Constitutionl7 which provides for direct legislation powers 
of cities that come under the authority of the state l egis lature, 
unless the city has a charter . 
l3Bird and Ryan, p. 315 . 
14california State Cons titution, Article 23, Sec . 13 . 
15california St a te Cons titution , Article 23, Sec. 14. 
16california State Cons titution , Article 23, Sec . 16 . 
l 7california Stat e Cons titution , Article 4, Sec. 25. 
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This relationship with the organic law was held to be valid. In 
the important 1911 decision, the court held that the method of removing 
an elected city official was purely a municipal affair "which in no 
way conflicted'' with the State Constitution.l8 
Hill v. Board of Supervisors, 176 C. 84, held constituional in 
accordance with the California Constitution, the act providing for 
recall in municipal corporations,l9 which received the major grants 
of authority providing for recall in California cities . 20 
Reaffirming the Hill decision, the California Supreme Court in 
Lindsey v. Dominquez, 217 C. 533 (1955), confirmed that election of 
municipal officers is exclusively a municipal affair and added that no 
cm~rt could determine otherwise. 
The power to cut short an elective official's term was unques-
tionably given to the people by the constitutional amendment of 1911 
and subsequent statutes enacted pursuant to that power.21 The courts 
and body of legal thought overwhelmingly held that recall 't.;ras completely 
valid and did not violate the provision of the California Constitution. 
In the late thirties the City Council of El Monte challenged 
the state constitutional validity of the 1931 Municipal Elective 
Officers Recall La~.;r. The criticisms rendered by the Council dealt 
with matters of policy, wisdom, and technique for r ecalling e lective 
lBconn v. City Council, p. 717. 
19stats., 1911, Ch. 185, p. 359. 
20The act of 1911 providing for recall in municipa l corporations 
amended the March 13, 1883 "Act to Provide for the Organization, Incor-
poration, and Government of Hunicipal Corporations ." 
21Laam v. McLaren , 28 C. A. 632 (1915). 
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officers as provided for in the act. The Council claimed that these 
were matters of a legislative nature for ~-1hich the courts had little 
concern. 
The court in this case, Baertschiger v. Leffler, 36 C. A. 2d 208 
(1959), did, hm-1ever, hold that the Municipal Elective Officers 
Recall Law22 was not violative of any part of the California Constitu-
tion. The case is significant because it held that statutory provi-
sions for recall could be codified into a body of general law Jealing 
specifically with the procedures and provisions of recall. Further 
codifications were made ·in 1939 and 1961.23 
III. RECALL'S LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION 
A statute, where it is fairly susceptible to a construction that 
is in harmony ~-1ith the California Constitution, i s to be liberally 
construed and made to comport ~vith l egislative intent. This principle 
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Chesebrough v. San Francisco, 
153 C. 559 (1926), and was more specifically stated in Cohn v. Isensee, 
45 C. A. 531 (1920), where the court held that in interpretation, 
l egislative intent is the controlling factor: "The purpose of all 
rules of cons truction is to ascertain, if possible the intention of 
the legislature . For it is the legislative intent that must contro1."24 
22stats., 1931, p. 563. 
231931 was the first year recall was codified into the Political 
Codes. In 1939 a gener al recodification of the political codes took 
place and in 1961 election provisions were codified into the present 
form of Election Codes. 
24
cohn v. Isensee, p. 538. 
Initially the courts received recall quite favorably and applied 
to it the liberal interpretation that appeared in keeping with the 
intent of the progressive-minded legislature. 
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The decision in Conn v. City Council, supra , stated that a city 
charter should receive a liberal construction "with a view to promoting 
the purpose for which it was enacted by the people. u25 This 
interpretation by the 1911 court has affected subsequent decisions 
relating to recall and is 0ften cited. 
Laam v. McLaren, 28 C. A. 632 (1915), provided another important 
statement on the application and philosophy of recall maintaining that 
statutes enacted aiding the organic provisions of recall should be 
construed liberally and should not be interfered with by the courts 
"except upon a cl~ar showing that the law is being violated."26 
Further co~ent is rendered on the philosophical and legal defin-
ition of recall in the case of Robinson v. Anderson, 26 C. A., 644 
(1915). By implication the court broadened the legal construction of 
recall provisions to ensure that original intent is always guarded . 
The words of the court s ugges ted a precedent-setting principle that 
was to be applied in future cases : "The statute must be . given effect 
rather than have applied to it a construction which will nullify the 
apparent intent of the legislature •••• " 27 Subsequent cases which 
proceeded in the same interpretive ve in r egarding the liberal construc-
tion are Worth v. Downey, 74 C. A. 436 (1925); 1-iagoon v . Heath, 79 C. A. 
25conn v. City Council, p. 712. 
26 Laam v. McLaren, p. 638. 
27Robinson v. Anderson, p. 646. 
632 (1926); and Othmer v. City Council of Long Beach, 207 C. 263 
(1929), "Statutes should be liberally construed so as to promote the 
purpose for which they were enacted."28 
No complete records of the cases going only to superior court , 
or county courts of the state ar e available, but according to Bird 
and Ryan the county courts were inclined to observe a conservative 
construction of the law.29 Higher courts on appeal wer~ in the 
twenties , liberal in their interpretation of the intent and law of 
recall. 
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The courts have been reluctant, generally, to defeat fair expres-
' sions of popular will as exhibited in elections and will not do so 
unless the law permits no other alternative.30 
IV. OFFICERS SUBJECT TO RECALL 
That general law cities were to abide by the statutes and codes 
passed by the legislature, as granted by Article XXIII, for recall was 
expressly stated in the court's decisions of Rutledge v . Dominquez, 
122 C. A. 680 (1932) and Goodman v. Dominquez, 122 C. A. 784 (1932). 
In the decisions of Rutledge and Goodman the court commented 
upon the constitutional source which gave cities express authority to 
enac t their own recall proc'edures. In their ruling the court held 
that cities \vere legitimately granted such express authority in 
28othmer v. City Council ££Long Beach, p. 275. 
29Bird and Ryan, p. 341. 
30Law v. San Francisco, 144 C. 384 (1904); See also J ennings v. 
Bro\vn~l4 C~07 (1896); and Packwood v. Brownell, 121 C. 478 (1898). 
Article XI of the California Constitution which provides for the 
organization of cities under a freeholder's charter. The provision 
states: 
It shall be competent in any charter framed under the 
authority ·of this section to provide that the municipality 
governed thereunder may make and enforce all laws and regu-
lations in respect to municipal affairs •••• 31 
In 1916 it was held in the decision of Shaefer v. Herman, 172 C. 
338 (1916), that the removal of officers by recall in cities having 
charters providing for the procedure was a municipal affair and not 
controlled by general laws inconsistent with charter provisions. 
The Shaefer case involved the attempted recall of San Francisco's 
city attorney Percy V. Long. Failure on the part of the board of 
election commissioners to call for the special election was due to 
the absence of properly dated signatures on the petition. 
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The respondents, wishing to prevent the recall election, claimed 
that the above-mentioned petition was void due to its failure to 
conform to the provisions of section 1083~ of the Political Code, as 
amended in 1915. The particular provision in the general law that 
the respondents referred to was the section requiring an affixed date 
next to the signer's name on a recall petition. 
The San Francisco charter, however, had no such provision, 
requiring only a signer's address. The court, citing Coffey v. 
Superior Court, 147 C. 525 (1905), reiterated the rule that where a 
freeholder's charter has provided a mode of removal of officers, the 
general law cannot control the exercise of the power in that manner, 
or change the procedure required by the charter. 
31Article XI, Section 8. 
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The principle that municipal charters were controlling in muni-
cipal affairs was firmly expressed in Betkouski v. Superior Court, 
34 C. A. 117 (1917). In their ruling the court said that in acts of 
the legislature regarding recall which are inconsistent with charters--
the charter will control.32 
If a municipal charter does not provide for r ecall, the courts 
I 
have ruled that such power, by a court of law, may be read into the 
charter and permit the electors to exercise direct legislation proce-
dures, including recall, in accord with general law provision.33 This 
principle expands considerably the opportunity for recall t~ be used 
anywhere. It appears tha t the courts have provided recall with the 
broadest application possible and have followed the tradition of lib-
eral construction in this respect. 
V. GROUNDS FOR RECALL 
As Bird and Ryan suggest, the question of the sufficiency of 
grounds for recall was a subject of considerable litigation in the 
early years of r ecall history.34 The result of such notable litigation 
regarding the sufficiency of grounds has l ed to the incorporation into 
almost all the r ecall laws of California the provision that the state-
ment of grounds "is intended solely for the information of the voters 
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and no insufficiency in the form or substance thereof shall affect the 
validity of the election or proceedings."35 
The first major case dealing with recall in a charter city 
touched on the issues of proper grounds for recall. Certain citizens 
of San Diego were seeking to recall City Councilman Jay N. Reynolds 
due to the alleged charges that his performance and discharge of 
duties while in office were in opposition to the will and preferences 
of his constituents. 
Reynolds had incurred the wrath of citizens apparently because of 
his vote in favor of an ordinance regulating the licensing of liquors 
within the city. This along with the charge that he had on several 
occasions obstructed referenda and other expressions of the people's 
will brought about the campaign for his removal. 
The city council refused to act upon the recall petition and 
voted to "table and file the same without action." 
In this case, Good v . Common Council, 5 C. A. 265 (1907), the 
appellate court stated that while charges of malfeasance, misfeasance, 
or nonfeasance were certainly applicable, the principle involving the 
grounds for recall should be liberally construed to go beyond such 
"specific" charges to more enlarged issues of answerable or responsibl~ 
tenure. 
In the matter of grounds for recall the most significant case in 
this area is Conn v. City Council, supra, in which the court firmly 
35out of the nine charte r cities adhering to their O\VU recall pro-
cedures, three differ from the general statement on grounds as stated 
by the general law. These three cities are Long Beach, San Bernardino, 
and Stockton; all three omit general law guidance in making a statement 
of grounds for the recall. 
enunciated the principle that the statement and reasons given for 
recall were only for furnishing information to the electors. In this 
respect the court declared: 
Petitions are only required to state generally their 
grounds or reasons for demanding the removal of the obnoxious 
officer, for the obvious and only purpose, it seems to us fur-
nishing information to the people of the community, upon which 
a political issue rather than an issue at law may be raised 
and determined.36 
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The principle that grounds for recall were matters of a political 
nature is very significant. The court in this area seems to be in 
full accord with legislative intent which in part sought to keep the 
substantive determinations of recall out of judicial jurisdiction and 
into the hands of the people. 
If grounds were held to be an issue at law, specific charges 
would have been required--such as malfeasance, misfeasance, or non-
feasance-- and the traditionally held liberal construction of the recall 
could have very well been abandoned.37 
The court also held true to Progressive principles and legislative 
intent when it stated that: 
• • • it is clearly the privilege of the people at the 
polls, rather than the province of the courts, to pass upon 
the sufficiency of the grounds stated for the removal of an 
elected officer by the modern method of a recall election .38 
This statement in the decision affirmed the point which Progres-
sives, and especially Hiram Johnson, made with regard to the right of 
36conn v. City Council, supra, p. 712. 
37Recent attempts have been made to incorporate the malfeasance, 
misfeasance, or nonfeasance requirement into the law governing recall. 
If this were done, judicial interpretation over these charges would 
almost likely be so ambiguous and multifarious that the purpose for the 
new standards would be defeated. 
38conn, supra, pp. 712-713. 
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an intelligent, reasoned electorate to determine its political des-
tiny. 
In the case Good v. Common Council, supra, a legal principle was 
stated which has always been an inherent political principle with regard 
to the recall. The Good, supra, court cited Croly v. Sacramento, 119 
C. 234 (1897) out of which the well recognized rule that the agency 
may be t e rminated at any time by the sovereign power without reason 
given. This then, more or less, captures Progressive philosophy and 
aids in better understanding principles of legislative intent. 
Several attempts have been made, by officers whose recall was 
sought, to challenge the sufficiency of the grounds for recall. Most 
notable among the cases is Laam v. McLaren, 28 C. A. 632 (1915) which 
the court refused to uphold a challenge against the validity of a 
recall petition containing what the officer thought were insufficient 
grounds. The court was emphatic in its ruling by stating: 
• the statement of grounds is intended solely for the 
information of the electors, and whether the plaintiff or the 
court to which he appeals regards them as sufficient grounds 
for the plaintiff ' s removal is inwaterial, as is also whether 
the grounds are true or false. The voters to whom the question 
of recall or r emoval is submitted ar e the judges of the suf-
ficiency of the grounds.39 
Here again the court reflects a theme inherent in the Progressive 
philosophy and in accord with legislative intent. The voters--the 
people--and not the courts nor the legislature were to be the sole 
judges of the grounds for recall. It was, after all, a political and 
not a legal question. 
In another case, Ratlo v. Board of Trustees of the City of South 
San Francisco , 75 C. A. 724 (1925), a group of trustees demurred to a 
39Laam v. McLaren, p. 638. 
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petition on the grounds that the charges were insufficien t of facts, 
ambiguous, unintelligible, and uncertain. The court in its ruling 
stated, as it had in Laam v. McLaren, supra, that the grounds were 
solely for the sake of information, and the sufficiency was not a 
question for the courts or trustees to decide.40 
VI. RECALL AND CRIMINAl, RESPONSIBILITY 
The first case in r ecall history that dealt with the issue of 
libel was in 1925, State of Washington v . Wilson, 241 Pac. 970 . 41 
The proponents of recall in the case argued that the truth or falsity 
of statements made in charges are absolutely qualified and can only 
be determined at the recall election for such election and exercise 
is political. 
In response the court stated: "Voters are not to be given carte 
blanche the privilege of making any allegations or statements concerning 
any officer sought to be recalled regardless of the truth or probable 
truth thereof •••• "42 
Thus the court denied that the matter of the petition is absol-
utely privileged, but may be qualifiedly privileged. This case along 
with the California cases to be presented here makes it fairly clear 
that great l atitude is allowed in the-matter of statements relating 
to grounds for recall, but can be actionable when malice is proven. 
In California the important and inevitable question of criminal 
responsibility for statements made in recall charges came up in Gunsul 
40see also Martin v. Board of Trustees, 96 C. A. 705 (1929). 
4lsee also 43 American Law Reports 1263, 1267, 1268. 
42state of Washington v. Wilson, 241 Pac. 970 (19 25) . 
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v. Ray, 6 C. A. 2d. 528 (1935) .'•3 Myrtle Gunsul, auditor for the 
city of Long Beach, was charged by recall proponents of taking unauthor-
ized funds f rom the city. Gunsul charged libel after the accusation 
was included in the recall statement and published. 
Ray, the defendant, held that the statement was absolutely privi-· 
leged unde r section 47 of the Civil Code where it states a privileged 
publication or broadcas t is one made, "In any (1) legislative or 
(2) judicial proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding 
authorized by law." The court ruled that recall is neither a legis-
lative or judicial proceeding. It stated, in apparent cognizance of 
the Conn decision, that recall is political rather than official in 
nature.44 Therefore, the court held that communications in recall 
proceedings are qualifiedly privileged where no malice is apparent.45 
Under a qualified privilege, or conditional privilege, the 
party communicating is protected by law from libel and slander action 
unless actual malice and prior knowledge of falsity of the statement 
is known. 
In cases of recall, qualified privilege can usually be relied 
upon for legal shelter because the communication, or charges against 
43In the study of recall published in 1930 by Bird and Ryan, neither 
appellate nor supreme court had yet passed judgment on a case involving 
the issue of libel in statements appearing on the petitions. 
44"0fficial proceeding" is defined in 46 Corpus Juris 1085, as a 
"term denoting action t aken by an officer." An "official act" is defined 
in 46 Corpus Juris 1084, as "any act done by the officer in his official 
capacity under color and by virtue of his office." Neither is true in 
the case of recall. 
45"Qualified privilege" comprehends communications that are made 
without apparent malice upon a matter in which the author has an 
interest. See Swift and Co. v. Gray, 101 F2d 976: and also California 
Civil Codes , Section 47, part 6 . 
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a public official, may be held as a matter of public interest. Usually 
in any matter of "public interest"--and recall would certainly fit 
here--qualified privilege may be claimed. 
In the Gunsul case, however, the court ascertained that malice 
was present and held that the case was therefore actionable. 
m1ile malice was proven to the satisfaction of the court, it 
declared that complaints charging libel based upon communications in 
the recall proceedings "must contain a proper allegation of malice., •. "46 
Thus, the burden of proof for libel rests upon the plaintiff. 
In 1964 the appeals court acted upon a similar case involving 
recall and libel in Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 C. A. 2d 237.47 
In the Kramer case a particularly "aggressive" recall campaign 
was carried on in Seaside against two members of the city council, 
Bessie W. Kramer and Thomas A. Dorney. The proponents of the recall 
charged Kramer and Dorney with conflict of interest in several official 
dealings and with failure to properly represent the voters of Seaside. 
During the recall campaign, the proponents displayed posters 
throughout the city depicting Kramer and Dorney as puppets on strings, 
being controlled by the hand of an unidentified puppeteer. The poster 
urged the recall of "Dorney and Kramer" and asked the question, "Tired 
of puppets in your City Government?" 
A letter was also circulated by the proponents charging that 
"Mrs. Kramer ,and Mr. Dorney are not masters of their own fate--that they 
are, in fact, the dupes of a most undesirable element in Seaside." 
46Gunsul v. Ray, 6 C. A. 2d 528, 530, 531 (1935). 
47Kramer v. Ferguson, 230 C. A. 2d 237 (1964). 
The court charged that the publications mentioned above imputed 
dishonesty and corruption to the council members and were libelous 
per se.48 Yet, libel was not actionable unless charges were made 
with malice. 
In the trial proceedings, the court awarded punitive damages in 
both actions against the proponents of r ecall, thus implying that 
malice was present in the actions of the defendants. Such malice, 
as the court pointed out, destroys the qualified privilege. 
The Kramer case is important because it represents a fairly 
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recent interpretation by the courts that statements made in connection 
with the recall proceedings are not absolutely privileged49 but may 
be libelous if malice can be proven. 
VII. SIGNATURE REQUIREMENTS 
Apparently the established signature requirement for recall 
petitions is arbitrary with no compelling reasons for the specific 
percentage demanded by law.50 
The courts have adhered to legislative intent in making the 
requirement what it is. In their ruling in Magoon v. Heath, 27 C. A. 
632 (1926), the court said: 
48Kramer v. Ferguson, supra, 242. 
49A privileged communication with regard to the law of defamation 
is a communication "which would be defamatory and actionable, except 
for the occasion on which, or the circumstances unde r which, it was 
made." See James A. Ballentine, Ballentine's Law Dictionary, ed. 
William S. Anderson (third edition; San Francisco: Bancroft-\Vhitney 
Company, 1969). 
SOThe California Constitution Revision Commission has found no reason 
for the percent of electors required to sign petitions and sees no 
reason for its change in either direction. California Cons titution 
Revision Commission, Article XXIII: Recall Background Study, May, 1968, 
p. 21. 
We think it is clear that the intent of the legislature 
in providing for twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast 
was to give some assurance that there was a substantial demand 
for the removal of an elective officer before the recall 
might be invoked. • • • n51 
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While the twenty- five percent signature requirement is an arbitrary 
figure, in most cases,52 it is a reasonable provision capable of 
dealing with the political situation of municipal government. When 
the signature requirement was lowered to twelve percent of the voters 
of the city, problems developed that had not existed when the require-
ment was at the twenty-five percent (of the votes cast in the last 
preceding municipal election) level.53 
In overturning a previous 1915 decision, Robinson v. Anderson, 
26 C. A. 644 (in which the court declared that the signature require-
ment should be based upon the "vote cast at the regular election at 
which the officer was elected, rather than a subsequent election for 
other trustee offices not including that which the officer in question 
occupies . ") . The Magoon, supra, court held that the basis for the 
percentage of signatures required should be based on the last general 
municipal election rather than a special election at which the office 
might have been filled. The court's reasoning for this ruling54 was 
51Magoon v. Heath, 79 C. A. 632, 635 . 
52Further comment will be made regarding the percent requirement 
and municipal political realities in the next chapter . 
53This was d'iscussed in the preceding chapter. 
54court ruled that the signature requirement should be based upon 
the "vote cast at the regular election at which the officer was e l ected, 
rather than a s ubsequent e l ec tion for other trustee offices not including 
that which the officer ln ques tion occupies." This ruling permitted 
the signature r equirement to be based on special e lections, if the 
officer was elected to said office in such an election, a t which the 
voter turnout is considerably less . 
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based on what they believed to have been the intent of the legislature. 
This is expressed in the court's opinion which states: 
We think it is clear that the intent of the legislature 
in providing for twenty-five percent of the entire vote cast 
was to give some assurance that there was a substantial demand 
for the removal of an elective officer before the recall might 
be invoked, and in providing that it should be the l ast 
general municipal election we think it is apparent that they 
had in mind the rapidly grm-ling incorporated cities and tmms 
where the vote cast at the las t regular municipal election 
might be considerably l arger than at previous regular muni-
cipal elections ••.. 55 
This seems to be the clearest statement explaining the rationale 
behind the original provision for the signature percentage requirement. 
The criteria upon which the twenty-five percent requirement was based 
changed in 1957,56 accompanied by s tatutory amendments making easier 
the clerk's duties in processing recall petitions. The 1926 Magoon 
case was the last major case involving the signature requirement to 
reach the appellate courts. 
VIII. PROCEDURAL TECHNICALITIES 
The appellate courts in most areas of recall generally took a 
liberal view of the technical requirements and ruled in favor of 
recall proponents wherever possible.57 
Such is the tradition of Worth v. Downey, supra, where the Board 
of Supervisors for the City of Lynwood refused to call a special 
election for the recall of one of their members, Frank M. Downey, on 
the grounds that the petition did not contain a specific statement 
s~agoon, supra, 636. 
56stats., 1957, Ch. 1316, p. 2636. 
57This principle was established in Rakow v. Swain, 178 C. A. 2d 
895 (1960). 
demanding the election of a successor. The court held that petitions 
need only be in language which meets the statutory requirements.58 
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It was the final opinion of the court that the petitions complied with 
the state statute's implied meaning. 
The Conn v. City Council, supra, decision declared that if every 
technicality was adhered to regarding recall proceedings "it would 
be practically impossible to invoke a recall election."59 The ruling 
was in response to the Richmond city council's failure to call a 
opecial recall election because some signers of the petitions did not 
sign their full names but gave only initials. In Chester v. Hall, 
55 C. A. 611 (1921), the court stated that the law of recall is to 
be liberally construed, taking into account the particular set of 
circumstances in each situation. 
In the Chester case, for example, the court held that while some 
signatures on a recall petition did not have dates affixed to them, 
enough signatures were dated in order that the clerk could adequately 
determine if the signers were qualified electors at the time of 
signing. The purpose for such a requirement, said the court, was 
simply to guard against signatures by persons who at the time of 
signing were not qualified electors . 
This spirit of liberal interpretation was reversed somewhat in 
Chambers v. Glenn Colusa, 57 c .. A. 1?~, (1922), declaring, with regard 
to the requirement on affixed dates, that.:._:the law is unequivical and 
should be made mandatory in all cases . 
58nowney, supra, 713. 
59conn v. City Council, 17 C. A. 705, 713. 
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This principle was upheld in Maycock v. Kerr, 216 C. 171 (1932), 
when the supreme court upheld the refusal of the registrar to accept 
for filing and certification on initiative petition which was required 
to have precinct numbers but did not . The court rendered an author-
itative interpretation: 
••• the constitution itself provides that the precinct 
numbers must appear on the petition, and this must necessarily 
mean that such precinct numbers must appear on the petition 
at the time the petition is presented to the registrar of 
voters.60 
The trend of liberal construction by the courts regarding the 
procedural technicalities of recall may be in eclipse. Appellate courts 
have become less inclined to rule in favor of recall proponents even 
though the procedural oversights may be relatively minimal. 
Beginning with the 1960 case; Rakow v. Swain, 178 C. A. 2d 895, 
the courts have tended to place the full burden for technical execution 
upon the proponents. For example, in the Rakow case the court ruled, 
contrary to its tradition of liberal construction, that while the clerk 
could assist proponents in execution of routine duties, the burden 
to ascertain the number of registered voters rests upon the circulators 
and not the city. 
Though somewhat obliquely applicable to .municipal recall, a case 
involving the attempted recall of California Governor Ronald Reagan 
gives some indication of the court's direction on the matter of tech-
nical requirements. 
In Lee v. Superior Court, 265 C. A. 2d 49 (1968), the court held 
against the Recall Reagan Committee which on July 31, 1968 , filed 
6~aycock v. Kerr, 216 C. 171, 173 (1932). 
with the Registrar of Voters a petition to recall Governor Ronald 
Reagan. Some precinct numbers had been omitted and the Committee 
requested of Regis trar Lee permission to add the numbers after the 
filing date of July 31. Lee refused, claiming that the law did not 
authorize him to allow such remedial activity after the filing date. 
The committee took their grievance to the Superior Court of 
Los Ange les requesting a court order allowing the proponents of 
Reagan's recall to add the missing precinct numbers. 
On August 12, the court issued a preemptory writ of mandamus 
directing Lee to permit at least 50 volunteers in the Registrar of 
Voters office to work on correcting and adding precinct numbers to 
the petitions. Lee was also directed to give his fullest possible 
. cooperation. 
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The decision of the Superior Court was an exceptionally magnan-
imous one, and went far beyond its scope of authority . The appellate 
court in Lee v. Superior Court, supra, struck down the ruling declaring 
Superior Court's lack of jurisdiction. 
In recent years the court has refused to bend the statutory 
r equirements and t echnical procedures must usually be met by the 
proponents of a r ecall. 
Fraud and dis-assembled petitions . There has been some question 
as to the form of the petition and its relationship to the number of 
officials sought to be recalled. The procedure can be executed in two 
ways. A joint petition may be circulated to remove officials en bloc. 
In this case the voter signs to recall all against whom the petition is 
. ..... ,. 
directed. I~, however, an elector favors recalling only one of the 
group he must sign a separate petition.61 
Petitions may be circulated in sections to facilitate the proce-
dure, but are held to be void if circulated in separate sections 
where it is dissassembled and the signature sheets are removed from 
the notice, statement , and answer, and then filed as a reassembled 
unit. The ruling on this matter is found in the case of Cunningham 
v. City Council of the City of Stanton, 200 C. A. 340 (1962) , where 
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the court declared that each petition shall bear a copy of the notice, 
statement, and answer on the face of each and every section.62 
In the Cunningham, supra, case the City Council of Stanton 
refused to call for a special recall election intended for two of 
their members of the grounds that the proponents had circulated a 
fraudulent petition. 
The proponents had circulated a face--or fact-- sheet containing 
in proper form the notice, statement, and answer with blank sheets 
of paper underneath containing numbered lines intended for signatures. 
These blank sheets were separated from the face sheet and circulated 
for signatures. 
The court held with the council in this case, stating that when 
the signed signature sheets were removed from the face shee t they 
lost their identity as a section of the recall petition. "Such a 
situation," the court stated, "is contrary to the apparent intent of 
61Lynn v. City Council of Culver City, 105 C. A. 182 (1930); see also 
re " singular" petitions, Bricker v . Banks, 98 C. A. 87. 
62cunningham v. Clty Council£! the City ££ Stanton, 200 C. A. 2d 
340, 342 (1962). 
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the statute which attempts to relegate city council action in the 
premises to the performance of a ministerial duty.63 
The decision apparently was based on the intention of discouraging 
cases of fraud and keeping all possibilities of misunderstanding at 
a minimum. 
In the case of fraud the courts have required substantial evidence 
to back up such charges.64 The burden of proof is upon the appellants 
and they must, to the satisfaction of the courts, show evid~nce of 
wrongdoing. An allegation of fraud must show the ultimate facts which 
amount to fraud or it is insufficient.65 Otherwise, it is presumed 
that the law is obeyed and will be liberally construed,66 If fraud 
has been committed, a court of equity may be resorted to as the proper 
forum to determine such questions under appropriate proceedings.67 
If an elector feels that a case of fraud has been committed or 
that his signature was acquired by misrepresentation and is dissatis-
fied, he may withdraw his signature by submitting a request for with-
drawal to the clerk and such a request will be honored. However, once 
the petition is filed, names may not be withdrawn.68 
63rbid. 
64Brown v. City Council of the City of Hawthorne, 103 C. A. 113 (1930). 
65Baroldi v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 472, 477; Lavine v. Jessup, 161 
C. A. 2d 59, 69; Richardson v. City of Redondo Beach, 132 C. A. 426, 
433; Peckham v. City of Watsonville, 138 C. 242, 244; Scafidi v. Western 
Loan and Building Company, 72 C. A. 2d 550, 553. 
66Laam v. McLaren, supra. 
67williams v. Gill, 65 c. A. 129. 
68Beecham v. Burns, 34 C. A. 759; Covell v. Lee 71 C. A. 361; 
Knowlton v. Hezmalhalch, 32 C. A. 2d 419; Uhl v . Collins 271 C. 1; 
McAulay v . Board of Supervisors, 178 C. 628; however, once the paper is 
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IX. RESTRICTIONS ON THE FREQUENCY OF RECALL 
One of the most significant and recent cases dealing with recall 
is Moore v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892 (1966), in which 
the court ruled on the frequency of filing consecutive petitions. 
The case in Maywood involved an attempted recall of Councilman 
John kearny and Councilwoman Maymie Anderson. The first recall 
attempt of these council members was voided because the city clerk 
discovered the dates added by some of the signers were prior to 
December 17, 1965, the day upon which the petitions were legally 
eligible for circulation and signing. 
The petitions were returned to the proponents without any certifi-
cation attached to those advising the party that the eligible signa-
tures did not amount to twenty-five percent of the total registered 
voters. 
The petitioners made a second attempt to recall Kearney and 
Anderson on February 16, 1966. The petit~ons were circulated and 
filed with the City Clerk of Maywood on March 29, 1966. The petitions 
were found to be sufficient and were promptly submitted to the Maywood 
City Council for the ordering of a special election. The council 
declined to call a special election for recall purposes asserting that 
within six months preceding March 29, the recall petitions had been 
filed, thus precluding a l egal filing for failure to wait the six month 
period as r equired by law (Election Code, section 27500). 
filed, names may not be withdrawn. See Rogers v. Board of Direc tors 
of Pasadena 218 C. 221; and Uhl v. Collins, supra. See also 18 Ops. 
Ca. Atty. Gen., 86 87 (1951)--.--
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The court was given the task of determining, (1) the definition 
of "filing" of a recall petition--that is, what constitutes a "filing" 
within the meaning of Elections Code, section 27500; and most import-
antly the court attempted to resolve what was thought to be a conflict 
in the Elections Code between sections 27500 and 27511. 
Section 27511 reads: " .•. the failure to secure sufficient 
names shall not prejudice the filing later of an entirely new petition 
to the same effect." Section 27500 reads: "Proceedings may not be 
commenced against the holder of an office who has had a recall petition 
filed against him within a period of six months." The court rose to 
this difficult occasion and ruled: 
In our opinion any filed recall petition bearing the 
clerk's certificate of sufficiency does not prohibit the filing 
of a new petition to the same effect for six months or any 
other particular time interval.69 
The court interpreted the words "filing later" of section 27511 
as being vague in meaning, not denoting any specific interval of time. · 
It was the belief of the court that the legislature intended to 
prevent the costly holding of frequent special elections rather than 
the mere filing of successive recall petitions that may be found to 
be insufficient. 
The court based the justification of its ruling upon the rationale 
of practical behavior. It said: 
A petition certified as insufficient would exclude the 
recall of an unfaithful or unscrupulous municipal officer for 
a period of 10 to 12 months; and a confederate of such an 
officer could prevent a recall indefinitely by seriatim r e call 
findings of invalid or insufficient petitions.70 
69Moore v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892, 902 (1966). 
70Ibid. 
While the court ' s bold ruling may have been a wise one, the 
author doubts whether the interpretation rendered was consistent with 
the legislature's original meaning of the provision. The law states 
that six months is the waiting period from the last date of filing,71 
while the Moore court determined the waiting period to be following 
the last recall election. 
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Regardless of the question involved, the decision of Moore, supra, 
stands and represents current interpretation by the courts. 
X. DUTIES OF CLERK AND MUNICIPAL 
LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS 
Filing. In the Moore case the court handed dmvn another major 
clarification in 1966 regarding the legal definition of a "filed" 
recall petition. The court declared that acceptable filing contem-
plated more than a "document, ~vhich on its face, purports to be a 
recall petition and to have appended to it signatures of voters in 
the required number."72 
The court went on to maintain that before a city clerk can file 
a petition, there must necessarily be a "petition" within the legally 
defined meaning of Elections Code, section 27510. The conclusion of 
the court on this matter was that a "petition" constituted, (1) com-
pliance in form with all statutory provisions, and (2) a determination 
on the part of the clerk that all such statutory conditions have been 
satisfactor ily me t.73 Only after such judgments and r equirements 
71Elections Code, section 27500. 
72Moore , supra , 897 . 
73Ibid., 899 . 
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have been met can a clerk properly and legally file a recall peti-
tion. 
Ministerial duties. The Elections Code requires that the clerk 
must, after the recall petition has been filed, "examine and from 
the records of registration ascertain whether or not the petition 
is signed by the requisite number of voters."74 The courts have 
determined that such duties are ministerial in function and not judi-
cial.75 All that the law requires the clerk to do is identify persons 
who have signed petitions and compare the names with the records of 
registration.76 The certification process must comply with the pro-
visions of the city charter or the courts will nullify the recall. 
Such was the case in Davenport v. City of Los Angeles, 146 C. 508 
(1905), where the supreme court, in one of its first decisions on 
recall, held that improper procedural action on the part of the clerk 
could invalidate the \?hole proceedings. In Koehler v. Board of 
Trustees of the City of Coronado, 53 C. A. 155 (1921), the court held 
that the clerk's failure to perform his duties properly were grounds 
for judicial review. 
74california Codes, Section 27510. 
75Baroldi v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 479 (1961); Ogden v. Board of 
Trustees City ~f Colton, 74 C. A. 161 (1925); Reites v. Wilkinson, 
95 C. A. 2d 827 (1950). 
76conn v. City Council, supra. 
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In a recent decision77 the court has clarified the principle 
"ministerial" function. The critical question in determining if an 
act required by l aw is ministerial in character is whether it involves 
the exercise of judgment and discretion.78 This decision reaffirms 
previous decisions t ha t clerks are not clothed with authority to 
r e ceive extraneous evidence of the contents of a petition,79 nor do 
- they have pm>'er to purge the petition of signatures secured by r eal 
or alleged fraud.80 The clerk's duty under the l aw is to do: 
no more than verify the purported signatures appearing 
on the pe tition with the great register and certify the result 
of tha t examination.Bl 
The word "purport," as used in the above decision and in the s tatutes,82 
simply refers to an instrument in writing, signifying "on its face" 
its sufficiency.83 
In cases of more complex and elaborate provisions of recall under 
home-rule charters, the courts have determined that the action of a 
clerk in determining whether or not a recall petition is sufficient 
under the provision of s uch a chart er, and not general l aw, may be 
77Jenkins v. Knight, 46 C. 2d 220 (1956). 
78Jenkins, p. 224. 
79Bee chum v. Burns, 34 C. A. 754 (1917). 
80Boggs v. Jordan, 204 C. 207 (1928) . See also Wright 
186 C. 659 (1921); McDonald v . Curry , 158 C. 160 (1910). 
Hartsock v. Merrit , 93 C. A. 365. 
8lwilliams v. Gill, 65 c. A. 129, 132 (1924). 
v . Engram, 
See also 
82stats., 1961, Ch. 23; California Codes, Section 27510 . 
83Rakow v. Swain, 178 C. A. 2d 895 (1960). 
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judicial in character.84 Thus in situations where applicable, the 
clerk may be clothed with greater authority to make his determination 
of signature petition compliance with charity law. 
In cases where fraud has been committed, a court of equity is 
the proper forum for recourse85 and such allegations must show ultimate 
and substantial evidence. However, while "it is the clerk and not the 
court which mus t determine whether the certificates substantially 
comply" with the law,86 such cases may arise where judicial discern-
ment is necessary. 
Insufficiency of petition. If the petition is found to be 
insufficient, the clerk must so state and return to its proponents, 
who then have an additional 15 days to file a supplemental petition.87 
The courts have ruled that, unless a charter specifically prohibited, 
proponents may make advance preparation for contingency of insuffi-
ciency on the first petition by commencing the circulation of sup-
plemental petitions immediately after they have filed the original 
petition.88 
Council demurrers. Upon certification of the petition, the 
clerk must then notify the city council.89 Early in the history of 
84Baines v . Zemansky, 176 C. 376 (1917); and Ficker v. Zemansky, 
176 c. 443 (1917). 
85Martin v. Board of Trustees, 96 C. A. 705; Watts v. Superior Court, 
-36 C. A. 692; l-lilliams v. Gill, 65 C. A. 129. 
86Fraser v. Cummings , 48 C. A. 504, 508 (1920). 
87stats., 1961, Ch. 23; Califo~nia Codes, Section 27510 
88Reides v. Wilkerson, 99 C. A. 2d 500 (1950). 
89Baro1di v. Denni, 197 C. A. 2d 472 (1961). 
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recall, and still to some extent, city councils have demurred to 
petitions claiming such petitions were insufficient, ambiguous, or 
fraudulent. Such has been the case when offici als sought to be 
recall ed were council members . The courts have consequent l y ruled 
that no discretion is vested in trustees in the calling of recall 
elections,90 and that no power of determina tion as t o the sufficiency 
of petition rests with munici pal l egi slative bodies .91 The duties 
of municipal councils with regard to r ecall are merely ministerial 
and upon the filing of certified petitions, councils must a t once 
order a special election for the question of recall.92 No power is 
given by the statutes to legislative municipal bodies to determine 
the sufficiency of petitions.93 
The courts have indicated in two cases that if the petition is 
obviously l acking in the legal requirements of form and substance, 
the council may refuse to proceed with its ministerial duties and 
its demurrer will be upheld by the court . 94 Otherwise, trustees 
have no discretion pursuant t o a petition -that conforms substantially 
to the l aw . 95 
9~artin v. Board~ Trus t ees , 96 C. A. 705 (1929) . 
91Ralto v. Board of Trustees of the City of South San Francisco , 
75 C. A. 724 (1925) . 
92Baertschiger v. Leffler, 36 C. A. 2d 208 , 212; Ralto v . Board of 
Trustees , supra; Williams v. Gill, s upra, 132; Jenkins v . Knight, supra , 
224; Truman v. Royer, 189 C. A. 2d 109, 115. 
93Loche r v. Wals h, 17 C. A. 727 (1911). 
94 Conn v . City Council, supr a , 350; and Sidler v. City Council of 
Baker"Sf"ield, 43 C. A. 349, 350 . 
95Hodges v. Kauffman, 95 C. A. 598 (1928). 
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From a brief review of recent court rulings on recall there 
appears to be no question that appellate courts have taken a more 
"restrictive" view toward the compliance of recall procedural require-
ments. There is no discernible rationale for this trend, though spec-
ulation might suggest that the courts now feel with the greater dis-
semination of information through improved communication no one should 
be naive regarding legal procedures. The courts might have also taken 
this restrictive attitude due to what they cons idered to be abuses 
in recall. Therefore, strict adherence mus t now be attended to by 
all engaged in us ing the popularly-initiated political alternatives 
of direct democracy. 
CHAPTER V 
RECALL IN HOME-RULE CITIES 
In connection with this study a postcard survey was conducted 
in the spring of 1971 asking either the City Manager or the City 
Attorney of each city of California to indicate whether or not any 
of the following had occurred between January, 1966 and September, 
1971: 
a . A recall election had been held in his city. 
b. A recall petition had been taken out but not filed. 
c. A recall petition had been filed, but had been found to be 
inadequate . 
d. A recall movement caused litigation. 
Results of the survey in terms of response were surprisingly 
successful, yielding a return total of 350 postcards from more than 
the 410 cities in California, nearly an 88 percent response. 
The following is a brief synopsis of the findings from the 
survey: 
a. Only 26 recall e lections took place in the period be tween 
January, 1966 and September, 1971. Three of those were in 
districts of the same city and two were in Cabazon. 
b. Only eighteen pe titions have been taken out, but not filed 
for verification. 
c. Eleven petitions have been filed with signatures, but have 
been found to be insufficient for calling an e lection. 





The number of recall elections in relation to the number of 
cities is not high, and appears to be on a dmmward swing from the 
period of the twenties and thirties. 
In the period 1924-1938, out of 270 cities there were 53 municipal 
recall elections held. 1 From 1966 to 1971 the re were 26 recalls in 
21 different California cities out of a total of 410 cities. 
From California's 410 cities, 330 are under the general law status 
and 75 are chartered. Of the ;5 chartered cities, all but 9 have 
chosen to be governed concerning recall by the general laws of the 
state. These nine2 abide by their o\m recall provisions. The remaining 
· chartered cities are directed into two categories, cities that are 
governed solely by the general law (56) and those governed by general 
law, but subject to certain provisions (10).3 
I. OCCURRENCE OF RECALL IN CHARTERED CITIES 
This study will illustrate how the difference in signature 
requirements is a significant factor in the number of recall elections 
which are launched. 
There is unmistakable evidence that suggests the presence of a 
discernible pattern in this respect, especially when the occurrence 
of recall in particular population categories with varying signature 
requirements is compared . 
!Frederick Bird and Francis Ryan, The ,Recall of Public Officers. 
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1930, p. 344. 
2Alameda , Alhambra, Berkeley, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Palo Alto, 




CITIES OF CALIFORNIA USING GENERAL LAW REQUIREMENTS FOR 
RECALL, AND CITIES USING THEIR 0\.JN RECALL PROVISIONS 
Size Cate-
gories 
Cities Using Their 
Own Recall Provis ions 
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@ Stockton, San Bernardino 
& Palo Alto 
Note: The 26 recall elections 
here include all recall 
elections through Sep-
tember , 1971. Data on 
number of cities is 
















3 0 0 
3 0 0 
.67 9 0 0 
.25 43 0 0 
60 4* .066 
95 7** .074 
56 3*** .054 
129 8**** .061 
*Bell Gardens, Fountain Valley, 
Elsinore, San Bruno 
** Banning , Imperial Beachl Lompoc, 
Sierra Madre, 3 in Seal Beach 
*** Anderson, Fillmore, Los Altos . 
Hills 
**** Avalon, Brisbane, 2 in Cabazon, 
Cloverdale, Emeryville , Farmers-
ville , Sand City 
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TABLE IV 
SIGNATURE PERCENTAGE REQUIREMENTS AND FILING 














25% of registered 
voters at last report 
to Secretary of State. 
79,60~ 30% of the total 
number of persons 
voting at last general 
municipal election. 
64,500 25% of the total vote 
cast at the last pre-
ceding general munici-
pal election. 
120,300 25% of the registered 
electors of the city 
on the day the peti-
tion is filed with 
the city clerk. 
389,028 25% of the entire 
vote cast at the last 
preceding general 
municipal election. 
Los Angeles 2,948,800 20% of votes cast for 
all candidates for the 
office in the last reg-
ular district elec-
tion. 
Palo Alto 56,000 12% of number of 
registered voters at 




60 days aft~r filing 
notice of intent 
tllith City Clerk. 
45 days after the 
date of filing of 
the notice of intention 
40 days after the 
filing of the 
affidavit. 
75 days from the 
filing of the notice 
of intention. 
State Election Codes. 
6 months. 
90 days from filing 








SIGNATURE PERCENTAGE REQUIRE~lliNTS AND FILING 









25% o£ the entire vote 
cast at the las t pre-
ceding general munici-
pal election . 
30% of entire vote for 
all candidates for the 
office cast a t the l as t 
preceding general muni-
cipal election. 
20% of the entire vo t es 





None given . 
10 days after date 
of filing petition . 
None given. 
As Table III indicates, recall has occurred more frequently in 
cities governed by spec i fic charter provisions than cities under the 
more s trict provisions of the state ' s general law . In cities which 
exceed a population of 50,000, four recalls have t aken place where 
indigenous charter provisions were used as opposed to no recalls in 
cities where the r ecall process i s governed by general law. The 
strictness of the general l aw provisions, especia lly in terms of 
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signature requirement, might well be a factor in the pattern of recall 
incidence. The recall index for cities u s ing their own recall provi-
sions i s 1. 92 whi l e in general l aw cities the recall index is . 255 . 




As previously mentioned, 21 different cities have experienced 
recall between 1966 and 1971. In dividing up the 21 recall cities 
into categories of general law and charter s tatus , a definite pattern 
begins to take shape. Of the 21 cities , four are chartered and have 
their own recall procedures. The remaining 17 are of general law 
classification, or at least adhere to general law procedure. 
A rough percentage index of these statistics yields the 
following: 
21 Recall Cities from 1966-1970 Period 
1. Nine cities in the state have their own recall provisions. 
2. 396 cities either have general law provisions or are general 
law cities. 
Cities Recalls Index 
Of the 9 charter: 4 .44% 
Of the 396 general law: 17 .04% 
As it can be seen from the information above, there is a consi-
derably higher percentage of recall incidence in chartered cities with 
indigenous procedures than in cities that comply with general law 
provisions. 
Before any valid determination or conclusion can be reached 
from these statistics, a comparative evaluation must be made of those 
nine charter cities in relation to the remaining cities of a general 
law orientation. 
II. BREAKDOWN OF THE NINE CHARTER 
CITIES HAVING INDIGENOUS RECALL PROCEDURE 
Of the nine chartered cities, four have had recalls within the 
1966-1970 period. The breakdown appears in Table V. 
I TABLE V 
INCIDENCE OF RECALL IN RELATIONSHIP TO POPULATION 
OF CALIFORNIA HO~lli-RULE CITIES 
Population No. Cities Cities 




100,000-200,000 3 Berkeley 
San Bernardino 
Stockton 










The chartered cities have an index of .44 in recall incidence 
as compared with .04 in general law cities. Statistically, this 
suggests that recall is easier to achieve procedurally in the above 
nine cities. A close comparative examination of their major recall 
features will shed further understanding on the index reading. 
Here it can be argued that the general law regarding recall 
signature requirements may no longer be wise within the context of 
present political realities. Initially, the law, prior to 1953 and 
1957, was founded on a politically realistic rationale. It sought 
to base the recall petition requirement on actual voting turnout 
rather than a potential electorate. Every student of voting behavior 
knows that in American politics--especially municipal politics--
electoral participation is minimal compared to the registered poten-
tial. This point is brought out in a study by Robert Alford and 
Eugene Lee on voting turnout in American cities. The study reports 
that the median turnout in partisan elections is approximately 50 
percent compared to only 30 percent in non-partisan cities.4 
In 1953 the California legislature changed the percentage require-
ment to 12 percent of the voters of the city. This means that the 
difficulty of securing signatures was raised in most instances. The 
fact that the unit upon which the percentage is based was completely 
altered has a bearing on the politics as well as the legal evolution 
of the recall concept. 
With the 1953 and 1957 changes--basing the signature require-
ment precentage on registered voters--the original progressive intent 
4Robert Alford and Eugene Lee. "Voting Turnout in American Cities," 
American Political Science Review , Vol. 62, September, 1968, p. 796. 
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regarding recall as a tool of participatory democracy has become a 
partial· misnomer. This observation is founded on the legal reality 
that the most important recall provision is no longer based upon 
participation in the democratic process, but rather potential statis-
tical participation as seen in voter registration records. 
There is, however, a practical side to the requirement. The 
1953 and 1957 changes made the signature figure less varied from 
one election to the next, thus making it easier for the proponents 
of recall t9 determine in advance the number of signatures needed 
on a petition. It should be obvious that clerical procedures are 
simplified by the more stable figure. With this in mind one can 
see that while the legislature may not have openly gone back on the 
principles of the Progressives, it has, however, clearly made it more 
difficult to use the right of recall. 
Professor Jerry Briscoe, who has made a careful study of the 
1967 Stockton recall, observes that in a small town where entrenched 
incumbents seem to control the city council, and where there is little 
electoral competition, there tends to be contested elections only 
occasionaly. When this happens, through no fault of democracy, there 
is a low turnout.5 
If the legislature left the recall provision as it stood ori-
ginally in the 1939 law, there would always be the chance that after 
one of these quiet elections, a recall could be roused with practically 
no support at all. 
5Jerry B. Briscoe, Department of Political Science, University of 
the Pacific, Stockton, California. 
The importance of electoral politics is voter participation that 
is demonstrated, not by registration lists, but by actual votes cast. 
This is the line of reasoning, it seems, upon 'vhich the original 
signature requirement was founded and ~pon which the above-mentioned 
eight charter cities operate. 
The impression of this author from interviews and conversations 
held with California state officials is that the present basis for 
signature requirement exists in part for reasons of efficiency, 
economy, simplicity, and expediency.6 Due to the increased complexity 
of modern state and local politics it becomes a burden to exercise 
even the slightest clerical function, such as determining proper 
signature percentages for zealous petition carriers intent upon 
recall. 
The evidence points to the conclusion that decline in recalls 
in recent years is due to the insurmountable task of acquiring the 
required number of signatures in order to validate a recall petition. 
The present 25 percent general law provision seems to be a fair 
requirement for cities with populations anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000, 
but is virtually impossible in the large metropolitan centers of 
California. For example, no recall elections since 1950 have taken 
place in either Los Angeles or San .Francisco. Any successful recall 
movement in the larger metropolitan centers would require an iss ue of 
tremendous proportions or a very large and hi ghly structured interest 
group. 
6E. g. Former Secretary of State , Pat Sullivan, State Assemblyman 
James Hayes, Legislative Assistant, Robert Stern, State Senator J ames 
tfuetmore, and Assemblyman Charles Conrad. 
1 
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III. PALO ALTO: A CASE STUDY 
In December of 1967 Palo Alto experienced a rather bitter recall 
contest which left acute impressions upon its citizens who challenged 
the old charter provisions. Consequently, in 1968 a Citizens Charter 
Review Committee was formed to discuss possible reforms of the charter's 
recall provisions. Several salient points on the recall concept came 
from the Palo Alto discussion. 
Debate over Palo Alto's ~nique recall ballot. The charter 
under which the 1967 recall--and Palo Alto's only recent recall--
took place was unique from the general law in that the name of the 
recallee was placed on a ballot containing an alphabetical list of 
those running for the office in question. There is not the usual 
question of whether X officer should be recalled, rather the winner 
is determined on the basis of a plurality vote. This method is 
similar, in principle, to the British system of a "vote of no 
confidence." 
The citizens of Palo Alto favoring this unique ballot form did 
so because it was more likely to "play down" sharp conflict and avoid 
the harsh imputations that often accompany recall.7 In contrast to 
the more widely used form found in general law provisions, the Citizens 
Charter Review Committee argued--almost unanimously--that the Palo 
Alto method was fair. Incumbents and challengers were pitted against 
each other on an equal footing. To win, a challenger had to receive 
more votes than the incumbent. 
7citizens Charter Review Committee, City of Palo Alto, Minutes of 
the Meeting of March 6, 1968, p. 6. 
A faction in Palo Alto opposing the Citizens Committee endorse-
ment of the old ballot form was spearheaded by the local League of 
Women Voters. The League argued on February 12, 1968, before the 
Charter Review Committee that general law provisions regarding the 
ballot form ,.,ere fairer to the public and should be adopted. Their 
position was that the essential question placed before the voters in 
a recall election is to decide whether the person should be removed 
from office, and if so, who shall succeed him. Under the old ballot, 
they claimed, the question before the voter was "Who shall best 
represent me?" The League of Women Voters felt that the charter of 
Palo Alto was not clear about \o~hether any particular councilman was 
being taken off the council, or ,.,hether there was simply being a vote 
of confidence. The league held that they wished to make recall as 
difficult as possible, therefore, they wished each specific councilman 
to be recalled listed, and the "yes" and "no" on his particular recall 
be voted upon. 
In response, the Charter Review Committee objected principally 
to the general law ballot on the basis that the incumbent must receive 
a majority of the vote (over 50 percent) in order to remain in office, 
whereas the candidate elected to replace him must receive only a 
plurality vote, e. g. 40 percent. It was felt, in the committee's 
majority report, that the Palo Alto ballot avoids the paradox where 
the person whose recall is sought might place his name on the list 
.,. . 
of candidates, lose the recall vote, but win the election to fill 
his own vacancy.8 
~ajority Report of the Palo Alto Citizens Charter Review Committee 
on Recall, 1968, pp. 8, 9. 
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The debate regarding an incumbent's dismissal on a majority 
vote, as compared to the election of his successor on a plurality, 
also appeared in a recent litigation initiated by Seaside Councilwoman 
Pearl Carey. Carey argued that recall elections were unfair in that 
a candidate running for a recallee's position is given the advantage 
of running for office by winning only a plurality. For example, 
i f a recallee receives only 49.9 percent of the vote on the recall 
questio~ he loses his seat while the candidate receiving a plurality 
may succeed to the office with only 32 percent of the vote. Carey's 
attorneys took the position that "the idea that one group can be 
granted grea t er voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, 
one vote basis of our representative government. Such a situation 
lacks the equality to which the exercise of political rights is 
entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment." 
The Carey case, similar to the Palo Alto debate on this issue, 
points out a criticism of the recall provision which has recently 
been voiced by its critics. The superior court has, however, stated 
that Carey's arguments were constitutionally insubstantial. 9 
Palo Alto's changes in signature requirement. In 1968 while 
Palo Alto's Charter Review Con~ittee was actively considering reforms, 
the issue of signature requirement was raised. The Palo Alto League 
of Women Voters apparently came into this discussion with bitter mem-
aries of the recall which took place during 1967. The League apparently 
wanted recall to become as difficult as possible to achieve and there-
fore organized a force to accomplish just that.10 Members of the com-
9More will be said on this case in Chapter VI. 
10Interview held with Mrs. Mason Myers, member of the Palo Alto 
League of Women Voters, June 28, 1970. 
munity, who were also on the Charter Review Committee, were more sym-
pathetic to recall and sought to preserve its essential character. 
The Charter Review Committee proposed that the recall petition 
signature requirement be changed from 20 percent of the vote cast in 
the last preceding municipal election to 12 percent of the registered 
voters. The purpose was to avoid the wide fluctuation from year to 
year in the number of signatures required for petitions under the 
old charter. The Committee offered the following statistics as 
evidence that little numerical change would occur (Table VI). 
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As Table VI indicates, the number of required signatures remains, 
under normal circumstances, approximately the same as under the old 
charter 20 percent requirement. The change was brought about more 
for the sake of convenience than anything else. 
Though the local League of Women Voters urged adoption of the 
general law provisions, those who had run the previous 1961 recall 
were still very much in evidence in the Charter Revision Commission 
and managed to have the signature percentage requirement reduced. 
Had Palo Alto revised this charter to adapt general law signature 
requirements the figures would have looked like those in Table VII. 
Table VII clearly indicates that recall would be much more 
difficult to achieve under the general law provisions. In the writer's 
opinion, had the city adapted the 25 percent requirement under general 
law, given the voting information above, the situation would be absurd 
and a flagrant disregard of fairness for proponents of recall. 
Palo Alto is illustrative of the need for specific charter recall 
provisions that coincide more with discoverable patterns of local 
electoral politics than with an arbitrary blanket provision as found 
in the state's general l aw requirements. 
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'TABLE VI 
THE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES NEEDED FOR 











Regis t ered Voted 20% 
Voters Voting 
25,747 14,889 2,978 
27,377 9, 779 1,956 
23,891 13,936 2,788 
TABLE VII 
THE NUMBER OF SIGNATURES NEEDED FOR 
RECALL IN PALO ALTO UNDER GENERAL LAW PROVISIONS 
Registered 
Voter s Voted 
25,747 14,889 













11source of Tab l es VI and VII is from a study prepared by the 
Citizens Charter Review Committee, 1968 . 
IV. RECENT SIGNIFICANT TRENDS OF RECALL 
IN HOME-RULE CITIES 
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There have been some important trends in home-rule municipal 
recall. These have usually been outgrowths of bitter community 
conflict in which a recall effort was the primary cause. Reforms 
that have come about recently in cities regarding recall were usually 
prompted by heated contests and enacted soon after the resulting 
recall election. Before considering case studies, a word must be 
said about the state district recall politics such as found in Los 
Angeles and Stockton. 
Los Angeles and district recall. The Los Angeles recall provi-
sions for City Councilman are based upon districts where 20 percent 
of the total vote cast for all candidates in the last district election 
is necessary to validate a recall petition. According to the elections 
office, this would average out for each district to be anywhere from 
5,000 to 11,000 signatures. Collecting these signatures is not an 
insurmountable task considering proponents have six months for the 
collection of signatures. 
Recall in Los Angeles appears to be a dormant issue. The last 
councilman recalled was in 1945 and the last filing for the recall of 
a councilman was in 1962 where the petition never met specifications 
of law. Even rumblings and threats of recall have not been extensive. 
The city's present procedures for the recall come from the charter 
which was revised in 1951 following the recall attempt on Mayor Fletcher 
Bowron, who himself had come into office as a result of the 1938 
Frank Shaw recall. The Bowron recall attempt brought much litigation 
which prompted revision of the charter. 
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Los Angeles is a semi-partisan city, therefore, the scarcity of 
recall might be the hesitancy of parties to engage in an otherwise 
non-partisan effort which could quickly become partisan. Parties 
generally conceive recall efforts as being out of their role. Since, 
after all, they are habitual opponents of the office holders of the 
other party, they would find it unseemly to attack an office holder 
without waiting for an election. 
Due to the lack of recall reform activity, Los Angeles apparently 
is satisfied with its recall plan. However, it must not be overlooked 
that Los Angeles has not had extensive recall activity. It is quite 
possible that the city would seek immediate revision to enact more 
stringent procedures, as did Palo Alto, following an especially heated 
recall effort. This has been the pattern of home-rule cities and the 
charter revision of recall in 1951 fits into this increasingly popular 
trend. 
Drift toward general law provisions of recall in home-rule 
municipalities. In the few r emaining cities where recall is controlled 
by special charter provisions there is an attempt to have recall come 
under the general law as provided in the State Election Codes. Such 
a trend is significant in that it would make recall considerably more 
difficult and pose, in most large cities , an insurmountable task to 
prospective recall proponents. 
Berkeley presents a prime example of this trend toward making 
recall more difficult. In October, 1964, the city of Berkeley exper-
ienced a bitter recall contest against several school board officials. 
Following the divisive event, a campaign based on the belief that 
recall was too easily achieved, attempted to have the twenty percent 
lU.£ 
Berkeley requirementl2 raised to twenty-five percent of the registered 
electors which is the same as in the general law. 
The signature requirement change was accomplished in April of 
1965, when memories were still smarting from the recall a year before. 
In an interview, Edith Campbell, City Clerk of Berkeley, stated 
that most city clerks probably favored the general law because it made 
recall more difficult. Campbell also expressed a point that has been 
consistently held to · by most city officials interviewed.l3 This is 
the practical argument that a city charter is much harder to change 
than a general law code to which a charter might refer. This is 
desired by city officials according to Edith Campbell and was reiterated 
by Ann Tanner, the City Clerk of Palo Alto. Miss Tanner also expressed 
the belief that recall was much too easy and should be made more 
difficult. 14 
The City of Long Beach has a rather vague recall section in its 
charter. Many of its provisions are similar to the general law, yet 
it remains silent on strategic procedures that should be made known 
to recall proponents. Where the charter is silent on important rules 
for recall, the State Election Code is employed. This makes the 
charter seem confusing and forces anyone ignorant of the law to refer 
also to the State Codes besides the city charter. 
12Twenty percent of the entire vote case for mayor at the last 
preceding municipal election . 
l3rnterview with Edith Campbell, City Clerk of Berkeley, February 23, 
1972. 
14rnterview with Ann Tanner, City Clerk of Palo Alto, February 23, 
1972. 
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The present signature requirement for Long Beach is twenty-five 
percent of the vote cast in the last general municipal election . 
City officials are, however, displeased with the present requirements 
and are attempting to have the charter recall provisions changed over 
to the State Election Codes. Their express purpose for this change, 
according to the city's election attorney, Ed Bennet, is to make 
recall harder to achieve. He said that the state law was a strict 
law and would therefore discourage recall attempts within the city.lS 
Bennet said that he did not believe in recall because it "does 
not serve any useful purpose," is a lot of work, and "wrecks the 
whole election process ." He bases his dis like for recall on the 
belief that it is too costly and is not fair to a politician who gets 
"jittery" with the recall threat. Bennet also held that since a 
recall election brings out "unstable guys" who would vote against 
anything, it is unfair to the incumbent who could just as well get 
voted out at the r egular election rather than a bothersome special 
one. 
There was also a genuine fear on Bennet's part that he would 
come under too much criticism because of the l ack of comple t eness 
in the city's provisions. He said that following a 1970 Long Beach 
recall he r eceived a great deal of criticism and was afraid of being 
taken to court, therefore he wanted to shift the responsibility 
to the State Codes. 
Bennet believed, as did other city officials, that the general 
election law could be changed very easily and should at some point 
lSrnforma tion on Long Beach gathered from interview with Ed Bennet, 
Long Beach City Elections Attorney , February 23, 1972 . 
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in the near future. He maintained that the state provision of twenty-
five percent (registered electors) was still too low. He seemed to 
think that it would be much easier to change the general law rather 
than the charter if ever a change was needed. "All I've got to do 
is just talk to my State Senator--boom! You got it changed." 
The hostility some Long Beach officials have against recall is 
perhaps acute and not consistent with a majority viewpoint. However, 
these opinions are in keeping with the general view toward recall 
which is at present a subdued disdain. On May 9, 1972 the people of 
Long Beach will vote on whether or not to change their recall to 
general law provisions. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION: RECALL IN PERSPECTIVE 
Recall is but one facet of the political tradition in California. 
It reflects the historical background of the s tate, and more broadly 
is characteristic of the principles of responsive government which 
have become salient ideals of this country's political heritage. 
The nature and course of its development as a democratic prin-
ciple once considered "radical" is important and adds further insight 
to the assessment of future experiments in the democratic process. 
I. OVERVIEH OF THE STATUTORY 
DEVELOPMENT OF RECALL 
The statutory l aw of recall has not been difficult to amend. 
Major changes as well as small technical amendments have been carried 
out with r e l ative ease. In 1953, for example, the 12 percent signa-
ture requirement passed in the California Assembly by a vote of 49 
to 2, with little debate. 
A pattern of increased complexity can be observed in the l aw. 
Numerous amendments to the original provisions have taken place, 
most of which have been t echnical, thus affecting the law substantially. 
Yet, it is significant that the legislature has not greatly disturbe d 
the basic principles and reserved powers of the r ecall concept. It 
has taken note, evidently, of the sacrosanct nature of reserved 
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powers. These powers, of which recall is a part, are inherent in 
the people and are protected by the government, as provided in the 
state constitution.1 
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The procedure of recall, as first laid down in the organic law 
and in the act dealing with municipal governments, was simple and 
without complex technical measures. Through its simplicity , however, 
certain areas of the original provisions were left ambiguous. l~ile 
remedial l egislation was certainly expected and needed , the author 
questions the justification for making recall more difficult while 
trying to reform it. 
The conceptual and legal framework for recall was established 
in 1911 with its incorporation into the state constitution. Consider-
able debate on its early abuses and weaknesses took place in the 
early years following its adoption. The 1915 and 1917 legislatures 
were most active in the discussion of remedial legislation. 
The period of major significance, however, was in the 1930's 
when the general law of recall underwent major revisions. Legislation 
in 1931 established numerous basic procedural requirements in recall 
such as pertains to circulation of the petition, major petition 
requirements, and provisions for notification, response, and publi-
cation of the charges. 
In 1939 the Political Statutes were codified for the first time 
and incorporated into the State's Election Codes. The codification 
indexed the l aw, but did not substantially alter any of the provisions. 
!california State Constitution, Article I, Section 2. 
Again in 1961 the election laws were recodified without substantQve 
revision to the content. 
107 
During the period 1967 to 1970, amendments to the law of recall 
were considerable. 2 The nature of the changes was remedial and mos t 
often not aimed at recall specifically, but accompanied corrective 
legislation in the whole body of election laws for the promotion of 
greater efficiency, uniformity, and economy . Yet, technical complexity 
in any procedure performed by laymen has a hampering effect which can 
easily induce discouragement . 
It would seem sensible and more in keeping with the spirit of 
direct democracy if in the near future the general law of recall 
might be made simpler, less restrictive in its maze of rigid t echnical 
requirements, and more uniform. Former Secretary of State, Pat 
Sullivan, suggested a logical course when he observed that uniformity 
should prevail in the procedural requirements for counties, cities, 
and districts.3 
While there appears to be no conscious effort on the part of 
the legislature and its members to subvert r ecall, there is a danger 
that it could become a victim of more protective requirements which 
complicate the law and detract from procedural simplicity. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF RECALL 
Early in recall history the courts established a very liberal 
attitude toward recall and consistently ruled in favor of letting the 
2ouring this period, 17 revisions of a technical nature were made . 
3rnterview with Pat Sullivan , January 14, 1971. 
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issue go before the people whenever possible. Yet, the relative ease 
of litigation and stalling tactics in the courts often have defeated 
the purpose of a liberal recall law. Early established principles 
which have guided the courts in their rulings on recall have consistently 
involved liberal construction with a view to promoting the purpose for 
which the charters have been enacted by the people.4 
With the increasing amount of mandatory, self-executing provi-
sions that the legislature has enacted in recent years, the courts 
have gradually reversed the liberal tradition in its recall decisions. 5 
This trend toward reinterpretation is not yet crucial, and is in many 
cases proper, guarding against indiscriminate and irresponsible execu-
tion of the general law provisions. 
A significant decision was rendered in 1966 by the court in Moore 
v. City Council of Maywood, 244 C. A. 2d 892. The ruling is important 
because the court far exceeded the established tradition of judicial 
interpretation in the matter of recall. While the interpretation 
rendered by the Moore court was far more liberal in substance than 
granted by legislative intent, it established what the author believes 
could become an unfortunate precedent of transcending original meaning 
and eventually restricting recall. 
A criticism pertaining to a highly significant question of law · 
has developed recently dealing with the principle of equal protection 
4conn v. City Council, 17 c. A. 705 (1912). 
5This is most noticeable in Chambers v. Glenn Colusa, 57 C. A. 155; 
Maycock v. Kerr, 216 C. 171; and Lee v . Superior Court 265 C. A. 2d 
49. Contrast with Conn v . City Council, 17 C. A. 705; Worth v. Downey, 
74 C. A. 632; Magoon v. Heath, 79 C. A. 632; and Cheste r v. Hall, 
55 C. A. 611 in which the courts have taken a more liberal view to 
the execution by proponents of technical requirements. 
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under the law as provided in Amendments I and XIV of the United States 
Constitution. 
The issue of the case6 was argued by city council members whose 
recall had been sought and consequently responded with a challenge 
to the constitutionality of certain provisions in the recall procedure. 
The respondents held that an incumbent in a recall proceeding must 
poll at least 50 percent of the votes on the recall question (Election 
Code, Section 27516), while the candidate to succeed to the office 
must only win a plurality of votes cast (Section 27518). In addition 
to these alleged inequities, the incumbent is prohibited from being· 
a candidate to succeed himself (Section 27516). 
It was held in the argument that interjection of a slate of 
candidates on the same ballot at the same election "materially subverts 
the recall question, "7 by the introduction of an "extraneo.us issue. "8 
The principle raised here is one of fairness to the incumbent who, it 
is a~gued, is being subjected to two different standards of election 
procedure. The Superior Court of California in the County of Monterey 
refused to issue a decision on the case due to insubstantial constitu-
tiona! grounds. 
There has been a noticeable lack of significant cases within the 
last five years which prevents any determination of a pattern in cases. 
6Pearl Carey, et al. v. City Council of the City of Seaside, et al. 
(1971). 
7In Petition for Writ of Mandate, Carey v. City of Seaside, June 18, 
1971, p. 12. 
8see above, p. 10. 
It does appear, however, that the courts will become as restrictive 
as the increas ing legislation imposing stricter requirements on the 
procedure. 
III. SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS ON RECALL 
110 
Recall is a reserved power of the people who have the authority 
to exercise their judgments in matters of a political nature r egarding 
an official's behavior in office. The recall is un~que in that it 
allows for an official ' s dismissal on purely political grounds. As 
Bird and Ryan observed, when an official is guilty of corruption, 
clearly proven, his removal from office is not the proper function 
of recall.9 Recall was not intended as r ecourse for criminal behavior. 
Rather, its use is to be a form of last resort where citizens can 
make judgments upon the performance of officials, based solely on 
politica l cons iderations. 
In their study Bird and Ryan noted that one of the major criti-
cisms of recall was its tendency to place the incumbent at a disad-
vantage with his opponents . The official originally e lected in an 
open-field election where only a plurality is needed to win must stand 
election in a bi-partisan contest, in which he must win a majority 
of the vote . lO They also point out that the form of ballot presently 
used forces an official to win not only against his r ecord but against 
a field of candidates . It obscur es the main issue "by injecting into 
the controversey an election campaign for a s uccessor ."ll 
9Bird and Ryan , p . 347. 
10Bird and Ryan, p. 81. 
llBird and Ryan, p. 361. 
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A more common criticism of recall in California is expressed by 
Assemblyman James Hayes who believes that too often recall is used as 
an irrespons ible weapon to harass and intimidate incumbents. Hayes 
contends that it is usually the disgruntled minority who initiates 
the nuisance recall.12 
Critics of recall charge that too often recall movements are 
prompted by differences in political ideology which should have no 
valid basis for grounds of recall, but should instead be aired at the 
regular general election. 
Some suggest that the solution to the above problem is to require 
that grounds for recall be made more specific and legally definitive. 
Assemblyman Hayes and former Secretary of State Pat Sullivan believe 
that the charges for recall should be misfeasance, malfeasance, and 
non-feasance.l3 
Generally, the grounds given for recall of an official are 
shallow and usually amount to some general expression of disapproval 
stated generically as incompetence or insufficiency. To some this is 
inappropriate and leads to irresponsibility. Yet, because recall is a 
political process, its grounds were intended to be based on political 
considerations. In providing for specific, legally defined grounds 
for recall, there would be a danger, in effect, of destroying the 
original recall concept. 
12Assembly Interim Committee Report on Constitutional Amendments, 
October 9, 1968, p. 25. 
13 These views were expressed in separate interviews with Hayes and 
Sullivan on January 19, 1971 and Augus t 17, 1971 respectively. 
Bird and Ryan observed in their study that recall is applied 
almost entirely to political (or quasi-political) officials--seldom 
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to technical officials, such as a city clerk. The same pattern has 
held true to the present and is significant in that while technical 
officials have the same opportunity to be s ubj ect to r ecall, the more 
mechanical nature of their duties decreases the chances for politically 
based charges against their performance. 
Bird and Ryan observed a correlation between the incidence of 
recall and the s ize of the political unit in their study. They 
maintained that the difficulty in using the recall is " somewhat in 
proportion to the size of the population. • nl4 
This situation is no less a problem today and has in fact in-
creased. The achievement of a recall in one of California's large 
urban centers, especially under the general la\-1 requirements, is a 
most difficult task. In view of the considerable metropolitan growth 
since the early twentieth century, it would seem more politically 
correct--and more in keeping with the progressive spirit of direct 
democracy--to amend the general law, basing petition signature r equire-
ments upon various population categories. Perhaps a better general 
law regarding signature requirements for municipal recall petitions 
might be as in Table VIII. 
Basing the signature requirement on a sliding population scale 
would contribute an element of fairness to recall l aw that is needed 
in this age when the gulf between popular control and bureaucratic 
self-perpetuation is an ever widening phenomenon. It would also repre-
sent a much needed move to achieve electoral reform. 
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IV. RECALL AND ELECTORAL ASSOUNTABILITY 
Professor John Vieg has suggested an appropriate context within 
which recall might be considered: 
This game of democratic politics ••• is the greatest game 
men have ever devised, its purpose being nothing less than the 
taming of power, the civilizing of it by making it responsible.l5 
Recall is a legitimate tool for taming the power of political elites. 
It brings into play the effective ability of electoral " checks and 
balances" and encourages greater discretion upon the part of political 
l eaders. Its execution, and the mere threat alone, should serve as 
a substantial deterrent against political leadership that has become 
entrenched and oligarchial.l6 
One of the possible benefits to accrue from the recall is a 
sharpening of electoral accountability where an official has exhibited 
only minimal concern for his constituency. 
Use, or threat of recall, if it is credible, tends to increase 
a public servant's political self-consciousness. It is through recall 
that electors may force their officials to face up to the reality of 
their future success in office. Joseph A. Schlesinger points to the 
importance of this function when he states: "No more irresponsible 
government is imaginable than one of high-minded men unconcerned for 
their political futures."l7 
l5Quoted from testimony given by Professor Vieg before the California 
State Legislature ' s Commission on Constitutional Amendments, mimeograph 
entitled "Revision of the California Constitution, Phase III: Article 
XXIII--Recall of Public Officers." October 9, 1968, p. 80. 
l6see Kenneth Prewitt's study, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, 
and Electoral Accountabil ity, " American Political Science Review , 
64:14, March, 1970. 
l7Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics (Chicago: Rand 
McNally and Company, 1966), p. 2 . 
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In a recall effort, officials are made more fully aware of the 
people's power, and it creates dialogue where the official must justify 
his performance in office and scrutinize more judiciously his future 
behavior in relationship to the community. 
V. THE RECALL CONCEPT AFTER 50 YEARS 
In his biennia l message to the 1915 Legislature, Hiram Johnson 
conceded that recall had been subject to wide abuse and that defects 
existed in his program of direct legislation. It was widely recognized 
in the early days of recall history that the law and its application 
often did not measure up to popular expectations.l8 
Recall has not become the panacea t o the ills of democracy as 
the California progressives had hoped. Yet, as an experiment in 
democracy, it has fared remarkably well, withstanding abuse, villi-
fication, and perennial revision. While it is being made harder to 
achieve, recall has remained consistent in principle to its bas ic 
tenets of . reserved powers to the people. There appears no threat 
to the existence of recall, however, constant vigilance must assure 
that its functional application not become eroded . 
Like any democratic concept, recall has been, and will continue 
to be, susceptible to abuse . Democratic principles which reserve 
political authority to citizens will not be without those weaknesses 
inherent in human nature itself. 
18Franklin Hichborn, Story of the California Legislature of 1915 
(San Francisco: James H. Barry Company, 1916), p. 102. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The author in this study has attempted to illustrate the diffi-
culties and restrictions which have gradually been placed in the way 
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of the recall process. Much emphasis has been made of original intent 
throughout the paper because the writer is convinced that the proposals 
put forth by the early California Progressives, such as recall, were 
politically poignant measures, aimed at opening channels of the 
political process in order that the electorate might be allowed more 
direct control of their political situation. These measures of direct 
democracy--initiative, referendum, and recall--were in their original 
form somewhat crude, not fully developed and often ambiguous, yet the 
spirit--the original intent--was one of simplicity and cogency which 
could be comprehended by those unaccustomed to an otherwise sophisticated 
political process. 
While recall is not a perfect answer to the problems of local 
politics, it has served as a useful tool where people may initiate 
their own political action in an attempt to penetrate problems derived 
from improper or inadequate representation. 
In the hope that recall will provide an open and healthy channel 
for conflict resolution--without further restrictions and obstacles 
placed in its path--the author urges retention of recall in a form 
that best serves popular control over political incumbents. 
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